


A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF STUDIES IN

CIVIL WAR HISTORY

CALIFORNIA

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VOLUME ONE NUMBER TWO

JUNE 1955

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
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Civil War History

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE
STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA



CLYDE C. WALTON, *Editor*
University Libraries

VOL. I

June, 1955

NO. II

Subscriptions & Manuscripts

CIVIL WAR HISTORY is published quarterly by the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. Editor: Clyde C. Walton, Jr. Assistant: William Dickey. Art work: Wayne Hampton. Copyright 1955 by the State University of Iowa. Second class mailing permit pending at the post office at Iowa City.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES in the United States and Canada are \$5.00 per year, or \$4.00 per member when Civil War Round Tables or Lincoln Groups subscribe for their memberships. Subscriptions to countries in the Pan-American postal union are \$5.40 per year, and to other foreign countries \$5.75. Single copies of the magazine are available at \$1.50 from The Abraham Lincoln Book Shop, 18 East Chestnut Street, Chicago 11, Illinois.

MANUSCRIPTS of a general nature should be sent to the Editor. Notes and Queries, material for *The Continuing War* and *For Collectors Only*, book reviews or books for consideration should be sent to the editors concerned, at the addresses listed in department headings.

CIVIL WAR HISTORY

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Editorial

IN THIS ISSUE OF CIVIL WAR HISTORY we present the efforts of four authors whose names are not yet as well known in the Civil War field as are the names of those who appeared in the first issue—Freeman, Williams, Eisenschiml and Long. One of the objectives of *Civil War History* is to present the work of new authors, when their work meets our standard of scholarly accuracy. We invite both the established scholar and the man beginning his career, to submit manuscripts for consideration. It seems possible that as the amount of material we receive increases, that we shall lengthen the magazine by adding additional pages to later issues. All manuscripts should be directed to the Editor, *Civil War History*, State University of Iowa Library, Iowa City, Iowa.

One of the most baffling aspects of the Civil War is the positive lack of adequate bibliographical materials. The number of books and pamphlets dealing with the War must be staggering, even under a fairly strict definition—I have heard one authority say that there must be more than 50,000. It is very encouraging to me to learn that Cecil Byrd and Carl Haverlin, among others, are at work on bibliographical projects which touch on the War. Perhaps the mass of material has frightened people away from the field; certainly some day someone is going to present a grand plan for a Civil War bibliography to one of the larger foundations. I believe that such a grand bibliography might well be financed and published by an educational foundation. At any rate, we expect that purely bibliographical contributions will appear in *Civil War History* from time to time. We have already made a good beginning through the interesting work of Ralph Newman in his column *For Collectors Only*.

The next issue of *Civil War History* will be devoted entirely to a series of essays concerned with the American theater and the Civil War. These essays, and the entire issue, will be edited by Dr. William R. Reardon, Department of Speech and Dramatic Art, State University of Iowa. Certainly we know little enough about the theater in this period of American history; we expect that these essays will be in the nature of a pioneering dash into unknown territory.

For the many people who asked about the front cover: this Confederate flag was adopted March 4, 1861, and is called "The Stars and Bars;" the United States flag is the national flag in use at the beginning of the War. The flag on the title page was that of the Second Division of the Nineteenth Corps. All of these flags may be seen on plate 175 of the Atlas to the *Official Records*.

Again, I invite your suggestions and participation in *Civil War History*.

CLYDE C. WALTON JR.

William Travis Crawford is a native of Lawrenceburg, Tennessee who entered the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis as a plebe in the summer of 1950. He wrote this study of the Spring Hill "mystery" prior to his graduation in June, 1954. Ensign Crawford is now on active duty with the United States Navy.

The Mystery of Spring Hill

W. T. CRAWFORD

THE YEAR 1864 WAS A YEAR OF DISCOURAGEMENT for Confederate hopes in Georgia. General William T. Sherman had moved into the northern part of the state in the last months of 1863 and was slowly pushing back the defending Army of Tennessee, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston. By July, 1864, Johnston had been forced back to the Chattahoochee River, a few miles north of Atlanta. It was at this point, on July 17, that President Jefferson Davis relieved Johnston and placed General John B. Hood, one of Johnston's corps commanders, in command of the Army of Tennessee. Atlanta eventually fell on September 6, and Sherman was in a position to commence his famous "March to the Sea."

The strategic problem then facing the Army of Tennessee was, in the words of its commander, "... in what manner, and accompanied with the least detriment, to effect the riddance of a victorious foe, who had gained possession of the mountains in our front, and planted his standard in the heart of the Confederacy."¹ Hood decided that the best solution would be to operate in Sherman's rear; to cut his line of communication between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Atlanta. Hood reasoned that Sherman would follow him as far north as the Alabama line, at which point he hoped to give him battle. During the month of October Hood began his series of attacks upon the Union garrisons along the Chattanooga-Atlanta railway, culminating in the re-capture of Dalton, a railroad garrison in northern Georgia.

In the meantime Sherman was not idle in Atlanta. Shortly after his capture of Atlanta, he had sent Major General George H. Thomas, with two divisions, back to Nashville, via Chattanooga, to consolidate all the troops then posted in Tennessee and northern Georgia. This was done to

¹ John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat* (New Orleans: Hood Orphan Memorial Fund, 1880) p. 243.

protect the Nashville to Chattanooga communications lines from the cavalry attacks of General N. B. Forrest, who had been raiding railroad garrisons in Tennessee.² Sherman then left one corps of his army at Atlanta and set out in pursuit of Hood.

General Hood later said that he had planned to give battle to Sherman at Dalton, but that his corps commanders were of the unanimous opinion that "... the army was not in condition to risk battle. . . In this dilemma, I conceived the plan of marching into Tennessee to establish our line in Kentucky."³ He hoped to cross the Tennessee River, move up through Tennessee, and re-capture Nashville. He then planned to move on into Kentucky and thence to the aid of General Robert E. Lee in Virginia.

This grandiose plan led to the bloody Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, and the consequent defeat of the Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Nashville a few days later. It is the purpose of this article to trace rapidly the movements of the opposing forces from the time of Hood's crossing the Tennessee River on November 21 through the day *before* the Battle of Franklin, which was fought on November 30. A highly significant episode occurred on November 29 which, though relatively unknown today, had a decisive effect upon the outcome of the entire Tennessee campaign. This episode is alternately referred to as the "affair" at Spring Hill, Tennessee, or the "mystery" of Spring Hill, because of the confusion which shrouds the events which took place on that fateful day.

After planning to march into Tennessee, Hood moved west from Dalton and eventually arrived at Gadsden, Alabama, on October 20. Hood was met at Gadsden by General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Commander of the Military Division of the West, for a conference on proposed strategy. After two days of deliberation, Beauregard authorized Hood to proceed with the plan.⁴ Hood's army continued moving west, until it arrived at Florence, Alabama, the point selected for the crossing of the river.

Hood was delayed at Florence by a lack of supplies and by difficulties encountered in crossing the river, which was swollen by heavy rains. He also was awaiting the arrival of a suitable cavalry force for his army. General Forrest's cavalry had been assigned to the army, and it arrived at Florence on November 15. Hood's entire army was across the river by November 20, and the march northward through Middle Tennessee commenced on November 21.⁵

General Sherman, in the meantime, had decided to "... leave Hood to

² Jacob Dolson Cox, *Military Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900) II, p. 312.

³ Hood, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

⁵ Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of Tennessee* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953) p. 383.

HOOD'S TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN



FIGURE 1

be encountered by General Thomas. . .⁶ and to carry out his "March to the Sea." On October 26 Sherman detached the Fourth Corps of his army, under command of Major General D. S. Stanley, to proceed to the aid of Thomas.⁷ On hearing that reinforcements, which were in the process of being sent to Thomas from Missouri, were slow in arriving, Sherman on November 1 detached the Twenty-Third Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, to proceed to Thomas.⁸

The Fourth Corps traveled by train to Chattanooga, from there by train to Athens, Alabama, and from there to Pulaski, Tennessee, which is about fifty miles northeast of Florence.⁹ The Twenty-Third Corps traveled by train to Chattanooga and then to Nashville, Tennessee. Here General Schofield conferred with General Thomas and then proceeded with his corps to Pulaski. Schofield arrived on the night of November 13 and assumed overall command of the forces at Pulaski on the morning of November 14.¹⁰ Operating with the Union infantry at Pulaski were a division and two brigades of cavalry, under the overall command of Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch.

Meanwhile, General Hood's infantry, preceded by Forrest's cavalry, commenced its advance to the north on November 21. Forrest's cavalry skirmished constantly with Union cavalry units but pushed steadily north. Schofield received definite reports of the Confederate's movements on November 21, and believing that his position at Pulaski was untenable in the face of a superior enemy, began moving his army north toward Columbia on the morning of November 22.¹¹ Hood's army left Florence on three approximately parallel roads. One corps travelled on the Florence-Waynesboro road, another on the Florence-Lawrenceburg road, and the third on a country road about half-way between the other two roads. (See Fig. 1) After getting as far north as the Lawrenceburg-Waynesboro area, the three corps converged on the Waynesboro-Mt. Pleasant road. It is not known why the army converged on this particular road, rather than using the more direct Lawrenceburg-Mt. Pleasant road. Possibly the choice of routes was because the commander-in-chief, General Hood, was travelling on the Waynesboro-Mt. Pleasant road.¹²

Hood hoped "... by a rapid march to get in rear of Schofield's forces

⁶ William T. Sherman, *Memoirs* (New York: Charles Webster & Company, 1875) II, p. 161.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁹ *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, (Washington: 1881-1900) Series I, XLV, part 1, pp. 119-20. (All references in this paper to this work pertain to the same volume; it will be cited hereafter O. R., followed by the appropriate page.)

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹¹ Jacob D. Cox, *The March to the Sea* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896) p. 64.

¹² O. R., p. 669.

... before they were able to reach Duck River [Columbia is located on Duck River]."¹³ In an effort to accomplish this objective General Forrest pushed his cavalry rapidly north, well ahead of the infantry. One of Forrest's divisions reached a point three miles below Columbia by the early morning of November 24 and began pushing a Union cavalry brigade back upon the town. Schofield had been notified the previous night that his cavalry was having difficulty checking Forrest's advance, and at three A.M. he had ordered his advance division, under General J. D. Cox, to march rapidly to Columbia. Cox arrived about 7:00 A.M. and interposed his division between the opposing cavalry units. Within three hours General Stanley's corps arrived at Columbia and "... a strong position was taken by the whole command, covering the town on the south."¹⁴

During the next three days the remainder of Schofield's forces arrived and entrenched strongly at Columbia. Forrest kept up an annoying fire until the Confederate infantry arrived on the morning of November 27.

The Union forces at Columbia consisted of two army corps and a cavalry force. The Twenty-Third Corps, under the tactical command of Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield totalled about 10,500 effective troops. Schofield's division commanders were Brig. Generals T. H. Ruger and J. D. Cox. The Fourth Army Corps, under Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley, totalled about 16,000 effective troops. Stanley's division commanders were Brig. Generals T. J. Wood, G. D. Wagner, and Nathan Kimball. The grand total of infantry was thus about 26,500 effective troops. Brevet Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson had arrived in the field on November 23 to assume command of the Union cavalry forces, which totalled about 6,000 effectives. Wilson's subordinate commanders were: Brig. Gen. Edward Hatch, commanding a division and Brig. Generals J. T. Croxton and Col. Capron, each commanding a brigade.¹⁵

Columbia is bounded on the north by Duck River, and Schofield deployed his strength in such a way as to protect the two possible means of withdrawal across the river. One was a pontoon bridge across a ford located centrally above the town, and the other was a railroad bridge about three miles to the west. Schofield felt that his position was "... much too extended for the troops I then had. . ."¹⁶ but he was expecting reinforcements enroute from Missouri, via Nashville, to arrive shortly. He felt that this position was essential for the contemplated offensive.

Ruger's division was entrenched to the west in the vicinity of the railroad bridge; Wilson's cavalry was deployed to protect the east flank;

¹³ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁴ Cox, *March*, p. 65.

¹⁵ O. R., p. 54.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

the rest of Schofield's forces (Cox's division; Stanley, with Wood's, Kimball's, and Wagner's divisions) were entrenched in a line south of the town. This central line of defense consisted of interior and exterior lines, and an advanced skirmish line.¹⁷ (See Fig. 2)

The advance corps of the Army of Tennessee arrived in the vicinity of Columbia on the morning of November 26, and the remainder of the army arrived on November 27.¹⁸ This army consisted of three infantry corps, plus the cavalry of Gen. Forrest. The corps of Lt. Gen. B. F. Cheatham — division commanders: Maj. Generals P. R. Cleburne, W. C. Bate, and J. C. Brown — totalled about 10,600; that of Lt. Gen. A. P. Stewart — division commanders: Maj. Generals W. W. Loring, S. G. French, and E. C. Walthall — totalled around 8,800; that of Lt. Gen. S. D. Lee — division commanders: Maj. Generals C. L. Stevenson, H. D. Clayton, and Edward Johnson — totalled around 8,600. The addition of General Hood's staff detachment, totalling about 500, brought the grand total to about 28,500.¹⁹ General Forrest's cavalry consisted of three divisions and a portion of a brigade. These units were commanded by Brig. Generals Chalmers, Buford, Jackson, and Col. Biddle, and totalled around 5,000.²⁰

At Columbia General Hood deployed his army in a line approximating the Union line. Lee's corps was formed with its right resting on the Mt. Pleasant-Columbia pike; Stewart's corps was on Lee's right with its own right extending to the Pulaski-Columbia pike; and Cheatham's corps was on Stewart's right with its own right extending to Duck River.²¹ (See Fig. 2)

Although the skirmishing was steady from November 24 until November 27, no frontal attack was made on the Union position. Schofield, doubting his ability to hold his extended line in the event of a full scale attack and feeling that his position could easily be turned by Hood's crossing the river on his flank, telegraphed Thomas on November 24, asking his views.²² Thomas replied the same afternoon, advising him to withdraw to the north bank of the river rather than "... run the risk of defeat by resisting too much."²³ Schofield commenced making preparations for the withdrawal on the night of November 25. He ordered Cox, with two of his brigades, to cross at the pontoon bridge. Ruger's troops were ordered to construct and occupy a bridgehead at the railroad bridge. Two of Stanley's divisions, Wagner's and Kimball's, were withdrawn to the interior line within the town. Wood's division and the re-

¹⁷ Cox, *March*, p. 66.

¹⁸ O. R., p. 670.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 678.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 752.

²¹ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

²² O. R., p. 1016.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 1017.

VICINITY OF COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE




FIGURE 2

maining brigade of Cox's division were left on the exterior line along with pickets.²⁴

After Cox's brigades crossed the river, the pontoon bridge was floated about two miles down stream (to the west) to a position in the rear and a little to the west of the interior line. The crossing of the remainder of the army, scheduled for the following night, was prevented by a severe storm and entire darkness. This movement was accomplished on the night of November 27,²⁵ after which the pontoon bridge was destroyed and the railroad bridge partially destroyed.

Schofield set up his defences on the north bank in such a way to best withstand an expected flank attack. Ruger's division was posted at the railroad crossing; Cox's division, in the center; Wilson's cavalry, to protect the various fords to the east. Stanley's corps was placed in reserve in the Columbia-Franklin pike in the rear of Cox's division in order that it might re-enforce any sector of the line, as conditions might warrant.²⁶ Schofield hoped to hold this position until the reinforcements arrived.

General Hood was not sitting idly by; he was laying plans for "one of those interesting and beautiful moves on the chess-board of war."²⁷ He believed that Schofield, with the river as a barrier between the opposing forces, would feel secure in his position. Working on this assumption, Hood planned to leave one of his corps to demonstrate with artillery on Schofield's front, while he crossed the river with the remainder of his army several miles to the east of the town. Then, by means of a rapid march over country roads, he hoped to "... place the main body of the Confederate Army at Spring Hill, twelve miles directly in the enemy's rear ... to attack as the Federals retreated, and put to rout and capture, if possible, their Army which was the sole obstacle between our forces and Nashville — in truth, the only barrier to the success of the campaign."²⁸

Forrest was ordered to cross Duck River on the morning of November 28. His three divisions moved rapidly in an easterly direction towards the several fords which had been selected for the cavalry crossings. The river was so swollen by the heavy rains that General Wilson partially accepted the opinions of the local citizens that the crossings were unfordable.²⁹ Forrest pushed on, however, and by four P.M. had succeeded in crossing two of his divisions. Forrest himself, with Col. Biffle's regiment, crossed the river at Davis Ford, about five miles east of Columbia.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

²⁷ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

²⁹ O. R., p. 1110.

Chalmer's division crossed about two miles to the east of Davis Ford. Jackson's division crossed a little to the east of Chalmer's point of crossing. Buford's division, attempting a crossing to the east of Jackson's position, at the point where the Lewisburg-Franklin pike crosses the river, met with stubborn resistance in the form of Col. Capron's brigade. Jackson, however, moved on Capron's flank and rear, effectively boxing in his force of some 1,500. In an untenable position, Capron's brigade broke off action at the river bank and concentrated on breaking through Jackson's line; they broke through with little loss. The Union withdrawal allowed Buford's division to cross the river. Thus Forrest's whole command, by the morning of November 29, was concentrated in the vicinity of Hurt's crossroads, some fourteen miles northeast of Columbia on the Lewisburg-Franklin pike.³⁰ (See Fig. 2)

Wilson, to the best of his ability, kept both Schofield and Thomas informed of the Confederate cavalry movements on November 28. Schofield received news about 4:00 P.M. of a probable crossing and reported it immediately to Thomas. Thomas replied that if Wilson could not drive back the enemy, he [Schofield] would have to make immediate preparations to fall back to Franklin.³¹ Judging from the movements of the Confederate cavalry, Wilson concluded that the Confederate infantry would advance to Franklin along the Lewisburg-Franklin pike. At 8:30 P.M. he sent a message via courier to Schofield, the message arriving about 2:00 A.M. This message informed Schofield that the whole of Forrest's cavalry had crossed the river.³² At 1:00 A.M. he sent another message, which arrived near daylight, informing Schofield that from information he had received from a Confederate prisoner, the Confederate infantry was shortly expected to cross the river on pontoon bridges then being constructed. The message added ". . . I think it is very clear that they are aiming for Franklin, and that you ought to get back to Spring Hill by 10:00 A.M. I'll keep on this road and hold the enemy all I can . . . communicate with me by Thompson's Station [north of Spring Hill] or Spring Hill, and thence eastward . . . Get back to Franklin without delay. The rebels will move by this road towards that point."³³

The urgent, almost imperative tone of Wilson's dispatch to his superior indicated his deep conviction that Confederate forces were moving directly toward Franklin.

The Confederate plans, however, did not include a direct advance upon Franklin. Forrest's cavalry pressed Wilson as far north as a road

³⁰ J. P. Young, "Hood's Failure at Spring Creek," *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, p. 25. Cox, *March*, pp. 71-2. *O. R.*, p. 558, 752-3. There was some disagreement on the names of the fords at which the crossings were made, but there was general agreement on the locations and times at which the various events were made.

³¹ *O. R.*, p. 1108.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 1113.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 1143.

which turned off to the east in the direction of Spring Hill. At this point Forrest detached a portion of his force to cover Wilson's rear and proceeded with his main body of cavalry towards Spring Hill.³⁴ Wilson continued to retire leisurely until arriving in the vicinity of Franklin. Because of Wilson's incorrect interpretation of Forrest's movements, Schofield was deprived of his cavalry at Spring Hill on November 29.

On receiving the initial report from Wilson, Schofield began to prepare for an attack on his left flank. He ordered the supply and ammunition trains to be parked north of the point where Rutherford Creek crosses the Franklin pike. Further, Schofield ordered Stanley to face his corps to the east in order to ward off a possible attack from that direction.³⁵ About this time General Wood wrote to General Stanley:

. . . It seems to me a little strange that General Schofield does not intimate what measures he proposes to adopt to protect ourselves . . . and still more strange that he does not initiate such measures at once, as the enemy, according to his own statement, has crossed the river in force. It is perfectly patent to my mind . . . that General Wilson will not be able to check him. It requires no oracle to predict the effect of the enemy's reaching the Franklin pike in our rear.³⁶

When Schofield received Wilson's amplifying reports at 2:00 A.M. and around daylight, he did take definite steps. Realizing the imminent danger to his immediate flank and rear, Schofield discarded Wilson's theory about Franklin. He instead took steps to protect both his rear at Spring Hill and his left flank at Duck River. Cox's division was left in its central position on the river bank. Wood's division of Stanley's corps was kept in position on the pike facing east. One of Wood's brigades, under a Col. Post, was ordered to reconnoiter to the east of the pike. At 8:00 A.M. General Stanley, with Wagner's and Kimball's divisions, was ordered to march for Spring Hill, to be followed immediately by the supply trains and the reserve artillery. At this same time General Ruger was ordered to leave one regiment at the railroad crossing and to proceed with the remainder of his troops to Spring Hill.³⁷

Apparently, Schofield believed that the Confederate attack would more likely occur in the immediate vicinity of his river bank defenses. At 8:45 A.M. Ruger's orders were countermanded and he was ordered to take a position on the pike facing east and a little to the north of Wood's division.³⁸ At 10:00 A.M. Schofield halted Kimball's division in the vicinity of Rutherford Creek and ordered it faced to the east.³⁹ By

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 752.

³⁵ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

³⁶ *O. R.*, p. 1115.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 340-1.

³⁸ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

³⁹ *O. R.*, p. 113.

this disposition of his army, Schofield spread his strength in a line from Duck River to Rutherford Creek, with one division on the march to Spring Hill.

After Forrest's cavalry had cleared a passage, Hood's engineers began laying a pontoon bridge on the night of November 28. The flank advance was carried out in the following manner: General Lee was left on the south bank with Stevenson's and Clayton's divisions and all of the artillery. Lee was ordered to put up a heavy bombardment on Cox's front in order to conceal the movements of the remainder of the army. Lee's third division, under General Johnson, was detached for duty with Stewart's corps. Cheatham's corps, being closest to the Davis Ford crossing, was detailed to lead the advance.

Early on the morning of November 29, General Hood crossed the river at the head of Cleburne's division, Cheatham's corps. This division was immediately followed by those of Bate and Brown. Next came Stewart's corps, with the divisions of Loring, Walthall and French crossing in that order. These in turn were followed by Johnson's division, of Lee's corps. The entire flanking force had crossed the river by 7:30 A.M. and commenced moving rapidly north on the Davis Ford road.⁴⁰ (See Fig. 2)

At 11:30 A.M. the head of Wagner's division was two miles below the town of Spring Hill when word was received that Confederate cavalry units were a few miles to the east of Spring Hill, heading rapidly towards the town. The division marched rapidly and, hearing firing to the east of the town, "... double-quickened into the place and deployed the leading brigade as they advanced..." They managed to repulse this cavalry attack which was overrunning the small garrison.

After repulsing the attack, Stanley ordered Wagner to deploy his division at once. The lead brigade, under General Opdycke, was posted to the north, with its left on the railroad to the west of the town and its right extending across the pike. Lane's brigade was posted on the eastern edge of the town. Bradley's brigade was sent to occupy a wooded knoll about three-quarters of a mile to the southeast of the town.⁴¹ (See Fig. 3)

General Forrest ordered another cavalry charge, but it too was repulsed. About this time Forrest received orders from Hood to hold his position at all costs "... as the advance of his [Hood's] infantry column was only two miles distant and rapidly advancing."⁴²

At this critical point in the action the published histories of the battle become vague and confusing. For the most part the movements of the various Confederate units are known and can be set down factually. The statements, however, made by Generals Hood, Cheatham, Bate, Brown, Stewart, and Johnson, concerning the movements of their forces

⁴⁰ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴¹ O. R., p. 113, 122.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 753.

vary considerably. In some instances these statements are in direct contradiction to one another. Most of the accounts were written years after the battle occurred, written in attempts by the principals to justify their actions. The long time lapse and the defensive nature of the statements naturally introduced inaccuracies. These inconsistencies will be compared in an attempt to determine, wherever possible, what actually happened. Some of the contradictions are inexplicable and must be accepted as one part of the "mystery" surrounding Spring Hill.

Cleburne's division, with Hood and Cheatham riding at its head, advanced along the Davis Ford road until it arrived about 3:00 P.M. at the point where Rutherford Creek crosses the junction of this road and the Rally Hill road.⁴³ General Hood said that from this point he could see the Union wagons and men to the west passing "at double-quick along the Franklin pike." Further, he related that he pointed out the enemy to Cheatham and Cleburne and ordered them to go at once and take possession of the pike, saying that he would double-quick Stewart's men to their support.⁴⁴ General Cheatham said of this incident that "... from the crossing at Duck River to the point referred to by General Hood the turnpike was never in view, nor could it be seen until I had moved to within three-quarters of a mile of Spring Hill."⁴⁵ The evidence on this particular point is in favor of Cheatham. It is a physical fact that the pike cannot be seen from the point where Rutherford Creek crosses the Davis Ford road.⁴⁶

Hood did, however, order Cheatham's corps to advance. Cleburne's division crossed the creek, advanced along the road to a point just above the home of a Col. Absalom Thompson (See Fig. 3), formed in a line facing west, with Lowery's brigade on the right, then Govan's, then Granbury's, and commenced the advance to the west about 3:45 P.M.⁴⁷ A unit of Forrest's cavalry operated on Cleburne's right.

Lowery's brigade soon met the right flank of Bradley's brigade in the wooded area and was fired upon. Cleburne's entire division then swung around to the right (using Lowery's brigade as a pivot) in a northwesterly direction upon the town. Finding his rear exposed by this maneuver, Bradley moved his brigade in a rapid retreat towards Spring Hill. During the retreat Bradley's brigade descended into a small valley. As Cleburne's division crossed the ridge in pursuit, the Union artillery at Spring Hill opened fire.⁴⁸ This artillery consisted of four batteries, a total of eighteen

⁴³ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 284. B. F. Cheatham, "The Lost Opportunity at Spring Hill, Tenn." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, IX, (1881), p. 524.

⁴⁴ Hood, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-5.

⁴⁵ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

⁴⁶ Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 387. Personal interview with Mr. Horn.

⁴⁷ J. K. Shellenberger, *Battle of Spring Hill, November 29, 1864* (Cleveland: Arthur Clark Company, 1913) p. 28.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

MANEUVERS OF CHEATHAM'S CORPS




FIGURE 3

guns.⁴⁹ On encountering the artillery fire, Cleburne withdrew his division over the ridge to re-form his line. (See Fig. 3)

General Hood had crossed the creek with Cleburne's division and had moved to the vicinity of the Thompson home, where he set up temporary field headquarters on the west side of the road. Cheatham remained at the Rutherford Creek crossing — on orders, he said, from Hood⁵⁰ — to assist Bate in crossing his division. Cheatham said his orders next called for him to move forward to put Bate's divisions in a position to support Cleburne's left.

As Bate was crossing the creek, Cheatham gave him orders to proceed to support Cleburne's left. Bate's division followed the road to Cleburne's line of attack. Bate said of his next movement: "Not seeing General Cheatham at the moment of forming my line of battle, General Hood, who was personally present, directed me to move to the turnpike and sweep toward Columbia."⁵¹

It is interesting to note that Hood ordered Bate to move to the pike and then sweep towards *Columbia*, with no specific mention of his supporting Cleburne's left. That Cheatham was ignorant of Hood's order to Bate can be shown by a subsequent order issued by Cheatham to Bate.

Bate's division advanced in a line of battle towards the pike. By about 5:45 P.M. his line had advanced to within two hundred yards of the pike, the left of his line being a short distance to the right and rear of the Cheairs home.⁵² Bate's skirmishers were within one hundred yards of the pike; they drove off a regiment of Wagner's division posted to guard the entrance of a small country road into the pike.⁵³

General Ruger's division reached the vicinity of the Cheairs home at about this time, and was attacked by Bate's division.⁵⁴ Just as the attack was being made, however, Bate received a message from Cheatham, via one of his staff officers, ordering him to halt and join his right to Cleburne's left.⁵⁵ General Cheatham evidently issued this order in accordance with Hood's previous instructions for him (Cheatham) to place Bate on Cleburne's left. Also, Cheatham was probably unaware that Bate was in actual contact with the enemy; had he known this fact, it is very unlikely that he would have issued the recall.

After Bate's division had crossed Rutherford Creek, General Cheatham moved to the portion of the field from which Cleburne's division had advanced and where Bate's division was about to advance. Cheatham related that he did not know at this time that Cleburne's division had

⁴⁹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁵⁰ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

⁵¹ O. R., p. 742.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ O. R., p. 742.

changed front and was then moving towards Spring Hill. Cheatham said that Brown's division arrived about this time and was ordered to form a line of battle to the right of Cleburne's point of departure and to begin the advance. Cheatham related that as Brown was executing this order, he (Cheatham) received word that Cleburne's division had been compelled to fall back and re-form with a change of front. Cheatham later related that he next received word from Brown that he was out-flanked several hundred yards to his right and that it would be disastrous to advance. Cheatham said that he sent word to Brown to throw back his right brigade and attack anyway; that he proceeded to Brown's position and ordered him to begin the attack after connecting his line with Cleburne's right; that he then rode off to inform Cleburne and Bate that they should attack upon hearing Brown's guns. Cheatham added in his account that on returning from Bate's position, he was apprehended by a courier from General Hood who requested him to come to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief (established for the night in the Thompson home); that he returned with the courier and found General Stewart at the headquarters with General Hood; that he was astonished by Hood's informing him that "... he [Hood] had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight."⁵⁶

General Brown told quite a different story, and certain other corroboratory statements lead the investigator to believe that Brown was more nearly correct and that Cheatham's recollection was hazy. Brown said that when his division crossed Rutherford Creek, it was ordered (possibly by one of Hood's staff officers) "... to pursue the road leading towards the Caldwell House [See Fig. 3] while Bate's and Cleburne's divisions moved at angle to the left." He related that he was subsequently ordered to the left and reached the Rally Hill pike near a toll gate; that there he was ordered by Cheatham to form a line of battle and to attack Spring Hill; that he commenced his advance as ordered but soon found that the enemy extended beyond his right flank for several hundred yards and that it would be "inevitable disaster" for him to continue. He added that he thereupon suspended operations to confer with Cheatham. He continued, saying that both Cheatham and Hood later approved his actions; that Hood ordered him to delay the attack until Stewart might be placed in position on his right; that in the meantime, his division should be held in readiness to "advance at a moment's notice." Brown said in conclusion that he received no further orders that evening or night to advance or change his position.⁵⁷

The report of one of Brown's brigade commanders, Col. Elliston Cap-

⁵⁶ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 525-7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 537-8. Letter from Major General John C. Brown to Cheatham, October 24, 1861.

ers, seems to bear out Brown's statement as to how his division was formed:

We arrived before Spring Hill about sunset, and were formed in a line of battle, facing the town and apparently about a mile distant.⁵⁸

Further light is thrown on the matter by the statement of one of Cheatham's staff officers, a Major Vault. Vault said that "... as Brown was the last to arrive, Cheatham pointed out his place to the right of Cleburne, and then gave him orders, as soon as his line was formed in two lines, to move his right brigade forward and attack the Federals who were posted south and west [east] of Spring Hill." Vault added that Cheatham told Brown he would order Cleburne to attack on hearing Brown's guns, and that as soon as Cleburne attacked, he would order Bate to advance. Vault related that Cheatham then rode away to give the order to Bate, "... expecting every moment to hear the signal from behind that the battle was begun, and kept asking impatiently: 'Why don't we hear Brown's guns?'" Vault said that Cheatham finally decided to ride back to see what was the matter; that on the way back to Brown's position, Cheatham was met by one of Brown's staff officers who had come to report that Brown was out-flanked on the right. Vault added in conclusion that Cheatham, on hearing this report, told the staff officer to "... 'Go with me and report to General Hood just what you have said to me', which being done, General Hood replied to General Cheatham: 'If that is the case, do not attack, but order your troops to hold the position they are in for the night'."⁵⁹

General Hood said of his meeting with Cheatham that when Cheatham rode up to his headquarters about twilight, "... I at once directed Stewart to halt." Hood said that he admonished Cheatham for not attacking; that Cheatham replied that the Union line was too long and that Stewart should first form on Brown's right. Hood related that he was astonished to hear these words from one of his veteran commanders; that he asked Cheatham if the addition of Stewart's corps would throw the Confederate line across the pike (?); that when Cheatham replied in the affirmative, "Guides were at once furnished to point out Cheatham's right to General Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon. . . ."⁶⁰

The statement of Governor Isham G. Harris (Governor of Tennessee, 1857-1863), a member of Hood's staff, is significant with respect to who decided upon the necessity of Stewart's being placed on Cheatham's right. Governor Harris related that Hood and his staff remained in the vicinity of the Thompson home after Cleburne's division had commenced

⁵⁸ O. R., p. 736.

⁵⁹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Excerpt of an article by Major Vault, from the *New York Evangelist*, May 2, 1889.

⁶⁰ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

its advance; that they presently heard what sounded like a heavy skirmish (Cleburne's encounter with Bradley's brigade); that after a while everything became quiet and remained so for a considerable time; that Hood sent him (Harris) to see what was the matter; that he came upon General Brown, who pointed out that he was out-flanked. Further, Harris related that he sent back word to Hood informing him of the situation and suggesting that Stewart's corps should be placed on Brown's right.⁶¹

From a careful scrutiny of the foregoing statements by General Cheatham, General Brown, Colonel Capers, Major Vault, General Hood, and Governor Harris, the investigator may draw the following conclusions: (1) Brown formed his line facing Spring Hill from the south and not facing westward as implied by Cheatham. (2) Brown's division arrived at this position after Cleburne's division had been re-formed and was formed on its right by order of Cheatham. (3) Cheatham then ordered Brown to attack, with the sound of his guns being the signal for Cleburne to advance. (4) Cheatham informed Cleburne of the plan of advance and then rode off to get Bate's division into position for the advance. (5) Cheatham became apprehensive when he did not hear Brown's guns; detached a staff officer to position Bate, then headed back to ascertain why Brown had not attacked. (6) The "courier" whom Cheatham mentioned as the one sent from Hood was actually the staff officer sent by Brown to inform Cheatham of his unfavorable position. (7) Cheatham and this staff officer returned to Hood's headquarters with the news. (8) Hood decided — possibly on Cheatham's recommendation or possibly on the recommendation of Governor Harris — that the advance should be delayed until Stewart's corps was brought into position on Brown's right. (9) Brown's staff officer duly reported these instructions to his commander and thus no attack was made. (10) Hood sent one of Cheatham's staff officers to General Stewart to place him in position on Brown's right.

An account of the movements of General Stewart's corps on the afternoon and evening of November 29 adds to the confusion which existed so bountifully within the Confederate forces that day. Stewart, riding in advance of his troops, reached the ford at Rutherford Creek as Cheatham's corps was crossing and was ordered by one of Hood's staff officers to halt his corps on the south side of the creek.⁶² That Stewart's division should have been halted by Hood seems strange when compared with Hood's statement to Cheatham that he was hurrying Stewart's corps,

⁶¹ Campbell Brown, *Military Reminiscences from 1861-1865*. Written in 1867-8, this unpublished manuscript is in the University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. (Microfilm at Tennessee State Library, Nashville, Tennessee.) Account of a conversation between Brown and Isham G. Harris, "about ten days after the battle."

⁶² Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 535. Letter from A. P. Stewart to W. O. Dodd, February 8, 1881.

"double-quick," to his support.⁶³ Stewart finally was ordered, "between sunset and dark," to leave one division on the south bank and to cross the creek with the remainder of his troops.⁶⁴

When General Stewart arrived at Hood's headquarters "at a little farm in the edge of the woods to our left on the road,"⁶⁵ Hood "... complained bitterly that his orders [to Cheatham] to attack had not been obeyed."⁶⁶ Stewart asked Hood why his corps had been held on the south side of the creek. Stewart said that Hood replied he had confidently expected Cheatham to rout the enemy and that he (Hood) had wanted Stewart in a position to intercept the enemy in case they tried to escape by moving off to the right of the pike below Spring Hill.⁶⁷

General Hood gave Stewart a guide and ordered Stewart to move on and place his troops across the pike to the north *beyond* Spring Hill. Stewart's corps advanced up the road used by Brown, but instead of turning left at the Caldwell house, proceeded up the road leading north. (See Fig. 4) General Stewart soon came upon Forrest's headquarters and stopped to confer with him. On leaving Forrest's headquarters, he was met by one of Cheatham's staff officers who said that Hood had sent him to place Stewart's corps in position on Brown's right. This struck Stewart as strange, but when the staff officer said that he had just come from Hood's headquarters, Stewart assumed that the General might have changed his mind.⁶⁸ The staff officer led Stewart's corps back down the road to the route previously followed by Brown's division. Stewart's corps advanced up this road until coming in contact with Brown's troops about 9:30 P.M.

When Brown explained his position to Stewart, it became evident to Stewart that if his corps were formed on Brown's right, it would not extend across the pike — but would bear away from it. "Feeling satisfied there was a mistake," he bivouacked his troops and rode back to Hood's headquarters to get further instructions.⁶⁹ Stewart was met on the way by General Forrest, and the two rode together to Hood's headquarters.⁷⁰

On arriving, Stewart asked Hood why he had sent the staff officer to change his line of march. Stewart related that Hood replied that General Cheatham had been to his headquarters and had pointed out that someone should be placed on Brown's right.⁷¹ Stewart explained that because

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 524. Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 285. In his account, General Hood makes no reference to halting Stewart's Corps south of Rutherford Creek.

⁶⁴ *O. R.*, p. 712.

⁶⁵ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 39. Letter from A. P. Stewart to Young, April 8, 1895.

⁶⁶ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *O. R.*, p. 712.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 713.

⁷⁰ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁷¹ *O. R.*, p. 713.

of his uncertainty as to what he was expected to do and because his men had been marching since daylight, he had ordered them bivouacked. "He [Hood] remarked, in substance, that it was not material; to let the men rest; and directed me to move before daylight in the morning, taking the advance toward Franklin."⁷²

Hood then addressed General Forrest, asking him if he could put a cavalry division across the pike north of Spring Hill. Forrest replied that he was practically out of ammunition. Hood then directed that Stewart should supply Forrest with ammunition and that Forrest should make the attack. Forrest and Stewart rode off together.⁷³

This account of Stewart's movements calls for a further analysis of Cheatham's statement regarding his meeting with Hood. This statement will be re-examined in order to point out how the Confederate statements, defensive in nature and written years after the battle, became distorted.

General Hood's account of his meeting with Cheatham obviously contained certain inaccuracies and distortions, but it *was* correct with respect to the whereabouts of General Stewart at the time. This reference was so poorly worded, however, as to mislead the casual reader: "By this hour twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt. . . Guides were at once furnished to point out Cheatham's right to General Stewart." On reading this account, one is led to believe that General Stewart was in the immediate vicinity at the time and was personally halted by Hood. Stewart, of course, was *not* present, but was marching north to place his troops beyond Spring Hill as previously ordered. The "guides" referred to by Hood was the staff officer sent to intercept Stewart and change his line of march.

Hood's account of the battle was published in 1880 after his death. Cheatham's account, published a year later, as a direct reply to Hood's account, contained many contradictions to statements made by General Hood. Cheatham must have been hazy in his recollection of this meeting, however, because it appears that he based his statement, at least in part, on Hood's account. For, although he denied vigorously certain parts of the conversation as reported by Hood, he *did* say that on arriving at Hood's headquarters, "I found General Stewart with General Hood."⁷⁴ Such a careless distortion of the truth discourages the investigator from relying too implicitly on statements made by Cheatham.

General Bate, on receiving the instructions through Cheatham's staff officer, ". . . obeyed the order of General Cheatham, and with delay and difficulty . . . I ascertained the left of Cleburne's line, which had

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Brown, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 526.

retired some distance to the rear of my right. (See Fig. 3)⁷⁵ This maneuver was accomplished with difficulty by about 9:00 P.M., at which time Bate sent word to Cheatham that in his new position, his left flank was exposed.

After bivouacking his troops for the night in this position, Bate, accompanied by a member of his staff, rode off to the Thompson house to inform Hood of his dispositions.⁷⁶ Bate arrived at headquarters while Stewart and Forrest were in conference with Hood.⁷⁷ After they left, Bate went in to see Hood and told him of his movements during the day, including the fact that he had not swept down upon Columbia as ordered because of a contrary order later received from his corps commander, General Cheatham. Bate related that "... General Hood replied in substance: 'It makes no difference now ... for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight.' He further said, in a congratulatory manner: 'We can sleep quiet tonight.'"⁷⁸ Bate and his staff officer left and General Hood and his staff went to bed.

The lone division of General Johnson, which had been left on the south bank of Rutherford Creek, crossed the creek about 10:00 P.M., and General Johnson reported to General Cheatham in the vicinity to the northwest of Hood's headquarters about 11:00 P.M.⁷⁹ Cheatham, having received Bate's request for re-enforcements on his left flank, detailed one of his staff officers, a Major Bostick, to place Johnson's division on Bate's left.⁸⁰ After getting into position, Johnson bivouacked his troops. (See Fig. 4)

General Forrest, after leaving Hood's headquarters, found that he was unable to get the desired ammunition from Stewart and Cheatham.⁸¹ Nevertheless, he ordered Jackson's division to move northward to seize and attempt to hold the pike near Thompson's Station. Jackson's division arrived at the specified position around 2:00 A.M. (time given as about 3:00 A.M. in the Union reports), and made a charge on the pike. This attack caused considerable confusion in the wagon train, which was moving past Thompson's Station at this hour. Units of Union infantry moved up, however, and drove off Jackson's cavalry.⁸²

⁷⁵ O. R., p. 742.

⁷⁶ Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 541. Letter from W. C. Bate to Cheatham, November 29, 1881.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 526.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁸² *Ibid.*

MOVEMENT OF STEWART'S CORPS AND JOHNSON'S DIVISION, LEE'S CORPS




FIGURE 4

DISPOSITION OF FORCES DURING THE NIGHT OF NOV. 29




FIGURE 5

This attack by Jackson's division of Forrest's cavalry was the only threat made on the pike during the night! The rest of the Confederate flanking force remained in bivouac to the southeast of Spring Hill. (See Fig. 5)

Shortly after midnight an incident occurred which remains unexplained to this day. A private soldier came to the Thompson house and aroused the household in order to see General Hood. He informed Hood that he had been accidentally within the Union lines near Spring Hill, and that the Union forces were moving through the town in great confusion; that the road was clogged with baggage trains and gun carriages. Following this report, Hood directed his adjutant, a Major Mason, to send a note to General Cheatham directing him to attack the pike. Then Hood went back to bed.⁸³

In his narrative General Cheatham mentioned receiving this note from Major Mason "to fire upon stragglers passing in front of my left." Cheatham related that he therefore sent Major Bostick of his staff to tell General Johnson that he must "... cut off anything passing on the pike." He added that General Johnson rode with Major Bostick up to the pike, but found "everything quiet and no one passing." Cheatham concluded by saying that they rode back and reported this fact to him.

The account sounds straight-forward and convincing, but it is completely obscured by another statement which was made by Isham Harris. Governor Harris related that on the morning of November 30, General Hood was condemning Cheatham's failure to make the attack during the night as directed. Harris added that Major Mason later called him (Harris) aside and said that "... 'General Cheatham is not to blame for that; I never sent him the order ... I fell asleep again before writing it'."⁸⁴

How could General Cheatham carry out an order which Major Mason said was never sent? This mystery remains unsolved. One possible answer might be that Cheatham was hazy in his recollection and that he was slanting his narrative to allow for a reference in Hood's account. Hood mentioned that at a late hour he received word of the Union movement and sent word to Cheatham "... to know if at least a line of skirmishers could not be advanced."⁸⁵

Throughout this period of confusing Confederate movements, General Schofield's actions are of a more easily understandable nature. At 10:45 A.M. he received a report from the aide-de-camp of Col. Post (whose brigade had been assigned reconnaissance duty to the east of the pike) saying "... a column of infantry is moving up from Huey's Mill or some point in that vicinity. ..." The report stated further that

⁸³ Brown, *op. cit.* Quoting Isham Harris.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Cheatham, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

⁸⁵ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

contact was lost when the infantry column passed behind a hill.⁸⁶ After receiving this report, Schofield issued a field order detailing the order in which the various divisions were to march to Spring Hill. Apparently, he was still of the opinion that the attack probably would be on his immediate left flank because he made no changes in his defense arrangements on the river bank.

About 3:00 P.M., however, he "... became satisfied that the enemy would not attack my position on Duck River, but was pushing two corps directly for Spring Hill."⁸⁷ For this reason he left orders for the general withdrawal to commence at dark and set out with Ruger's troops towards Spring Hill. They arrived in the vicinity of the Cheairs home around 6:00 P.M., where they encountered Bate's division. Schofield related that his forces "... brushed them away without difficulty [Bate received his recall from Cheatham at this time] and reached Spring Hill about 7 o'clock."⁸⁸ After a short conference with General Stanley, Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to Thompson's Station. He stationed Ruger's division to guard the pike at that point. General Schofield returned to Spring Hill to wait for the arrival of the remainder of his army from Columbia.⁸⁹

In accordance with Schofield's instructions, at 7:00 P.M. General Cox left two of his regiments on the river bank as skirmishers and set the remainder of his division in motion for Spring Hill.⁹⁰ Cox said of the march that it "... was made in the most perfect order; the men, knowing they were moving near the enemy's positions, kept well closed up."⁹¹ Enroute to Spring Hill, Cox's division passed the divisions of Wood and Kimball, respectively, which were still stationed on the pike. Arriving at Spring Hill about midnight, Cox received orders to march rapidly to Franklin. Ruger's division joined Cox's at Thompson Station and the two divisions continued the march. The head of the column arrived at Franklin about 9:00 A.M. the next morning.⁹²

Wood's division followed immediately on the heels of Cox's division and arrived in Spring Hill about 1:00 A.M.⁹³ Wood's division was deployed about one mile to the north of Spring Hill, parallel to and slightly east of the pike. His division was put in this position to act as a guard for the wagon train which had been put into motion for Franklin immediately after Cox's division had moved from the town.⁹⁴

⁸⁶ O. R., p. 1139.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The train, which totalled about 800 wagons (including artillery and ambulances),⁹⁵ was slow in getting under way. The difficult crossing of a narrow bridge was the cause for the delay. General Stanley related that he was strongly advised by some of his officers to "... burn the train and move on with the troops and such wagons as could be saved." Stanley, however, said that he was determined "... to make an effort to save the train ..." and the movement was therefore continued.⁹⁶

Kimball's division, being joined by the skirmishers originally left on the river bank, followed Wood's division to Spring Hill.⁹⁷

It is interesting to note that the Union forces passed unusually close to the Confederate lines during their withdrawal to Spring Hill. General Stanley said that the Confederate line was so close on their flank that "... when a column was not passing, it was difficult for a staff officer or an orderly to get through on the road."⁹⁸

Kimball's division moved out of Spring Hill about 2:00 A.M., travelling to the right of the road as a guard for the train. Presently, a cavalry attack (Jackson's division) was made on the train in the vicinity of Thompson's Station. Kimball was ordered to move his division forward and clear the road, but the attackers were driven off by Wood's division before he arrived. The attack succeeded "... in destroying a few wagons and stampeding a few cattle."⁹⁹

Wagner's division, having been assigned the initial defense of Spring Hill, was also assigned the rear guard duty. Maintaining its semi-circular defense positions until the last of the trains had cleared the town, the division then began its withdrawal. The main force left Spring Hill at 4:00 A.M. and the pickets at dawn.¹⁰⁰

General Lee's two divisions crossed Duck River about 2:30 A.M. and engaged the withdrawing Union forces by skirmishing. This skirmishing, augmented by the addition of other Confederate units in the early morning, continued until the last of Wagner's division reached Franklin at noon on November 30.

Franklin, like Columbia is bounded on the north by a river. At Franklin, however, General Hood attempted no flanking movement. Probably feeling disappointed with the flanking attempt of the previous day, he ordered a frontal attack upon the Union entrenchments, which, by this time, had been thrown across the pike. The result was the Battle of Franklin — one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War, a battle in

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-5.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 404.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114. General Stanley apparently was implying that the Confederate line was so close to the Union flank that Union staff officers and couriers had to remain on the pike, even though it was crowded.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 342.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 149.

which the Army of Tennessee suffered heavy losses but failed to effect a break in the line. General Schofield subsequently withdrew his forces to Nashville.

At Nashville, Schofield's forces were combined with those of General Thomas, and this combination was shortly added to by the long-awaited re-enforcements from Missouri. Pitted against such strength, the Army of Tennessee was soundly defeated at the Battle of Nashville a few days later, shattering the high hopes of General Hood for a victorious advance into Kentucky.

The failure of the Confederate flanking attempt at Spring Hill can be attributed first of all to the lack of a definite and well-organized plan of action. It is evident that General Hood either failed to work out beforehand the specific details of the proposed movement, or that if he did have such a plan in his mind, he failed to brief adequately his subordinate commanders. This situation was evidenced by the confused and countermanded orders and by an overall lack of co-ordination among the various units.

Secondly, General Hood seems to have failed to grasp the full significance of the situation as it developed at Spring Hill. His failure to take decisive action after receiving the various reports of inactivity during the evening and night of battle stands out as evidence to this fact.

The final and most important fault was that the entire group of Confederate Generals seems to have been permeated with a paralyzing lack of initiative. The popular notion seems to have been to make no offensive movement, no matter how inviting the situation might appear, unless fully authorized and so directed by higher authority.

The combination of these deficiencies played a major part in the Confederate Forces' losing a decisive advantage at Spring Hill. There was considerable truth in General Hood's statement concerning Spring Hill—

Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for which we had labored so long — the best which this campaign has offered, and one of the best afforded us during the war.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 657.

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The Confederate Chaplain

SIDNEY J. ROMERO

"IT IS ONE OF THE GLORIES OF SOUTHERN PEOPLE, that Christian character and manners of a gentleman, give a minister of the gospel all the rank he needs in the army or out of it."¹ This was the opinion of an editor who wrote for the Confederate GI's. The Congress of the Confederate States of America apparently subscribed to this tenet; for when, on May 3, 1861, it established the office of Chaplain, it gave him no specific rank or command.² Though the law implied that the chaplain's would be a commissioned office, it left his actual status undefined to such an extent that one chaplain was addressed at various times as "Captain", "passon", "preacher", and even "Chapel."³

The law provided that appointments and assignments of chaplains were to be made by President Jefferson Davis. The President, however, hesitated to use this authority for fear that peremptory appointments would give rise to situations whereby a minister of one denomination might be appointed chaplain to a unit made up of men of another denomination.⁴ As a result, chaplains were usually appointed on the basis of recommendations made by commanding officers of various military units.⁵ It was alleged, however, that this method of selection was unfair since "in nine cases out of ten, these officers prefer a good companion to a good minister."⁶

Nevertheless, a great many officers, both religious and irreligious in their personal lives, were more than anxious to procure the services of

¹ *Army and Navy Messenger* (Petersburg, Virginia), May 1, 1863.

² *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series 4, I, p. 275. This work will be cited hereafter as O. R. J. M. Matthews (ed.), *Acts and Resolutions of the Second Session of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States* (Richmond: 1861), p. 3.

³ *Religious Herald* (Richmond, Virginia), July 17, 1862.

⁴ O. R., 4, I, p. 766.

⁵ *Religious Herald*, November 19, 1863, quoting *Confederate Baptist*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, February 27, 1862.

an efficient and effective minister. The officers of one regiment went so far as to have a prospective chaplain preach for them in order to determine whether or not he was qualified to serve them in that capacity.⁷ The Tennessee regiments were required by state law to choose their chaplain by popular election.⁸ However, this did not prove an ideal method for many ministers refused to involve themselves in what offered to become mere politics.⁹

Because some ministers were uncertain as to the proper procedure for getting themselves a chaplaincy, because others were unable, despite their efforts to procure one, and because of many other reasons, the shortage of chaplains was a source of much complaint throughout the war.¹⁰

More than half the regiments in Gordon's Brigade were without chaplains in March of 1864¹¹ and Hampton's Brigade, a cavalry organization, had but two chaplains as of September, 1863.¹² General T. J. Jackson took special pains to have his corps provided with chaplains; yet, on March 10, 1863, almost two years after hostilities had begun, he stated in a letter to the Adjutant General that more than half of his regiments were still unsupplied.¹³

Some chaplains undertook to remedy this situation by appealing to their brethren, and in time even the soldiers began to join in these appeals.¹⁴ An earnest, though brief, appeal was sent to the *Religious Herald* from a soldier in Camp Pickens: "Where are the ministers of the gospel! As a soldier, confined in camp, secluded from all refining influences, torn asunder from all moral restraints, I make this inquiry — where are the ministers of the gospel! Will they spurn us because we cannot present a polished exterior? Will they forsake us because we are eminently exposed to death and the allurements of the devil?"¹⁵

After reading a number of such letters, one begins to wonder about the causes for this shortage of chaplains. They seem to fall into two categories, the first of which is of a material nature and the second a matter of human nature. The basic factor in the first was the anomalous

⁷ *Ibid.*, July 4, 1861.

⁸ Dunbar Rowland (ed.), "Chambers' Journal," *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, V (1925), p. 289.

⁹ Arthur H. Noll (ed.), *Dr. Quintard Chaplain C.S.A.* (Sewanee, Tennessee: 1905), *passim*. Manuscript letter, Charles Todd Quintard to George C. Harris, November 5, 1861, in Tennessee State Library.

¹⁰ *Religious Herald*, November 19, 1863.

¹¹ *Southern Christian Advocate* (Augusta, South Carolina), April 7, 1864.

¹² *Ibid.*, September 10, 1863.

¹³ Manuscript letter, General T. J. Jackson to General S. Cooper, Adjutant General, Confederate States of America, March 10, 1863, in Confederate Museum.

¹⁴ Manuscript letter, John Paris to Reverend W. H. Wills, April 9, 1863, in Wills Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

¹⁵ *Religious Herald*, June 13, 1861.

status of the chaplain. Although his was theoretically a commissioned office, the chaplain himself was seldom treated individually as a commissioned officer.

Indicative of this fact is a Congressional Act of August, 1861, which allowed chaplains to draw the same rations per diem as those of privates.¹⁶ When, consequently, the Commissary General ruled that chaplains were prohibited from purchasing family supplies from the Commissary, as other commissioned officers were permitted to do, a widespread feeling arose that the chaplain was being discriminated against.¹⁷

Neither were the chaplain's living quarters superior to those of his men. Reverend Charles T. Quintard, chaplain to the First Tennessee Regiment, graphically described his housing arrangements in November, 1861. His tent was furnished with an old box in which were stored sundry articles such as handkerchief, one shirt, and one pair of socks. On the box was a large Bible, a volume of sermons, letters, paper and ink stand with no pen. On each side of the box he had stuck a bayonet into the ground to serve as candle sticks. By one bayonet was a bushel of corn for his horse and an empty bottle in a haversack. On the other side were his clothes wrapped in a blanket. These things, together with a pile of hay upon which he spread his blanket to make a bed, completed his furnishings.¹⁸

Then the matter of horses presented a problem. Every chaplain in the field was in real need of a horse. Many, because of age and habit, could not hope to keep up on the long marches if they were forced to go afoot. Neither could they hope to fulfill their duties to the men of their unit who, particularly after a battle, were often scattered all over the countryside.¹⁹ Consequently a great many chaplains either brought along a horse or procured one soon after they reported for duty. They were then faced with the very real problem of obtaining food for him, for it was not until January, 1864 that, at the instigation of General "Stonewall" Jackson,²⁰ Congress passed a law entitling the chaplain to draw forage.²¹

Of course, outstanding in this category of material reasons for the chaplain shortage was the meagerness of the salary. The Congressional Act of May 3, 1861, had set the salary of chaplains at eighty-five dollars a month.²² Not quite three weeks later, Congress cut the stipend to fifty

¹⁶ *Acts and Resolutions of the Third Session of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States* (Richmond: Enquirer book and job press, 1861), p. 72.

¹⁷ *Church Intelligencer* (Raleigh, North Carolina), April 3, 1863.

¹⁸ Manuscript letter, Charles T. Quintard to George C. Harris, November 5, 1861, in Tennessee State Library.

¹⁹ *Southern Presbyterian* (Columbia, South Carolina), July 30, 1863.

²⁰ *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church*, VII (1938), pp. 242-3.

²¹ *O. R.*, 4, III, p. 194.

²² *O. R.*, 4, I, p. 275.

dollars a month.²³ A Mississippi judge, a member of Congress and a Campbellite by persuasion, probably was responsible for the reduction. He vigorously championed the lower rate in a speech in which he argued that, since a chaplain had to preach only once a week and had all of the rest of the time to himself, he should not be paid the same salary as a lieutenant who had to work the whole week.²⁴

Another argument offered in support of the reduced level was that it would prevent worthless ministers, more interested in pecuniary gains than in moral inspiration, from entering the service.²⁵ Whatever the motives of Congress, the decrease in salary met with a barrage of protest.

One soldier wrote to the *Church Intelligencer* that if a colonel, major, or captain received a salary of fifty dollars a month he would soon leave the service; yet the Confederate government expected the chaplains to remain.²⁶ A clergyman informed the same organ that because of the cut in salary many able ministers would be forced to resign.²⁷ His prediction proved to be true, and soon the War Department was flooded with resignations.²⁸ Perhaps in response to the numerous resignations of chaplains, Congress, on April 19, 1862, raised the salary of the chaplain to eighty dollars, the equivalent of a second lieutenant's pay.²⁹

The second category of reasons for the chaplain shortage concerns the individual minister and his conception of where he should serve. Many ministers thought they would be more valuable to the Confederate cause in a secular capacity. Some served as highly competent officers, and many more as loyal, patriotic private soldiers. It was said "there are enough worthy, intelligent and truly pious preachers serving as private soldiers to fill every vacancy in the army."³⁰ On the other hand, some ministers felt that their duty lay with their civilian flocks, a point of view which was encouraged by some of the organized churches. The Protestant Episcopal Church especially believed that the religious needs of the army should not be considered primary.³¹

Much credit, however, must be given to the activities of most of the churches, their officials and their governing bodies for their unflinching attempts to send qualified ministers to the army and to see that they

²³ J. M. Matthews (ed.) *Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States* (Richmond: R. M. Smith, 1864), p. 116.

²⁴ *Church Intelligencer*, December 20, 1861.

²⁵ *Southern Presbyterian*, November 16, 1861.

²⁶ *Church Intelligencer*, September 27, 1861.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Manuscript letter, Chaplain Joseph Brown to General Samuel Cooper, January 13, 1862, in Adjutant General Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²⁹ *O. R.*, 4, I, p. 1076.

³⁰ *Southern Christian Advocate*, November 5, 1863.

³¹ *Journal of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Alabama held in St. John's Church, Montgomery, on the 5, 6, and 7 May, 1864* (Mobile, Alabama, 1864), p. 15.

were adequately supported.³² At the meeting of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1861, it was decided to place one chaplain or permanent missionary (a missionary being a minister who labored in the army without commission or salary from the government) in each brigade of the army and to raise the necessary funds to support each missionary and to supplement the salaries of all chaplains.³³ That some churches did augment the chaplains' salaries is indicated by an article in the *Religious Herald*, a Baptist paper, which stated in February, 1864, that more than eighty Presbyterian ministers laboring in the army were partially supported by their church, making an expenditure of \$9,000 per month or \$108,000 a year.³⁴

Certain units in the armies tried to augment the work of the churches by offering their own inducements. One such unit tried to solve its problem by offering to raise \$100 a month if a zealous minister would come to them on a full-time basis. One entire brigade, still without a chaplain in July, 1863, offered not only to supplement the regular salary but promised to provide a horse also — if the minister who came to them was a Presbyterian.³⁵

The Congressional Act creating the office of chaplain was ambiguous in many ways. For instance, the entire matter of what the chaplain should wear was left to his individual discretion. This lack of regulation resulted in some adopting the regular military habit, some wearing a feather in the hat, and others electing to retain the usual clerical garb.³⁶ One chaplain was afraid his clerical dress was too military. He wrote to the Secretary of War requesting that some "simple trimming" be adopted since "the dark clothing usually worn by the ministers too closely identify them in appearance with the deep blue of the Yankee troops to make it either desirable or safe."³⁷ Occasionally the chaplains of a unit would effect a concert of action in dress. Those of the Army of Tennessee adopted the Maltese Cross as a badge. This cross was made of gold or brass, about an inch in diameter and worn on each side of the collar like a major's star.³⁸ The chaplains of the Second and Third Corps, Army of Virginia, decided to use as a badge the letter "C" with a half wreath of olive leaves worked in gold bullion on a background of black velvet. It was about two and one half inches wide.³⁹

³² *Southern Christian Advocate*, June 4, 1863. *Richmond Christian Advocate*, December 11, 1862.

³³ *Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America with an Appendix 1861* (Augusta, Georgia, 1861), p. 138.

³⁴ *Religious Herald*, February 11, 1864.

³⁵ *Southern Presbyterian*, January 29, 1863.

³⁶ *Church Intelligencer*, July 25, 1861.

³⁷ Manuscript letter, Chaplain Oscar M. Addison to Secretary of War George Randolph, in War Department Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³⁸ *Army and Navy Messenger*, May 1, 1863.

³⁹ *Southern Churchman* (Richmond, Virginia), June 12, 1863.

No regulations prescribed the chaplain's duties. These were determined by individual conscience and the exigencies of war.⁴⁰ The activities generally undertaken by a regimental chaplain were about as follows. When military conditions permitted, the Sabbath usually was observed by appropriate services.⁴¹ The chaplain held private conferences about spiritual matters with individuals. When revivals began to spread through the army, he baptized men by the score and, upon request, received them into his particular church.⁴² He distributed tracts and books,⁴³ visited the messes, visited the sick,⁴⁴ buried the dead,⁴⁵ comforted the sorrowful, prayed with the dying, administered the sacraments or ordinances, attended meetings of the Chaplain's Association, and in general prepared the soldier to see in all things the hand of God and willingly carry His cross.⁴⁶

A chaplain worthy of the name realized not only that he should be solicitous for the welfare of the soldier's soul, but that consideration should also be given to mental and physical needs. In some cases he conducted classes in reading, writing and grammar, and at least once, because of such activity, a mother received the very first letter ever written by her son.⁴⁷ One chaplain attempted to set up a library and reading room for the sick and wounded soldiers in the hospitals.⁴⁸ Chaplain N. A. Davis of the Fourth Texas Regiment could not bear the sight of his men going barefooted to the front lines. He made use of the

⁴⁰ O. R., 4, I, p. 275.

⁴¹ *Southern Presbyterian*, July 6, 1861 and May 31, 1862. *South Western Baptist* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama), July 31, 1862. An Impressed New Yorker, *Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army* (New York: 1862), p. 43.

⁴² *South Western Baptist*, October 24, 1861 and November 24, 1864.

⁴³ *Religious Herald*, February 13, 1862. *Southern Presbyterian*, May 18, 1861.

⁴⁴ Manuscript letter, Jones McDowell to Mrs. L. M. Keitt, October 6, 1864, Manuscript Department, Duke University Library. James H. M'Neilly, "A Day in the Life of a Confederate Chaplain," *Confederate Veteran*, XXVI (November, 1918), p. 471.

⁴⁵ O. R., 1, XI, part 2, p. 876. *Journal of the 48th Annual Council of P.E. Church in the State of North Carolina . . . May 18, 19, 20, 21 and June 22-23, 1864* (Fayetteville: Printed by Edward J. Hale and Sons, 1864), p. 49. *Southern Christian Advocate*, August 18, 1864.

⁴⁶ Manuscript account, by J. H. B. Hall, "The Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Alabama During the Civil War," *passim*. in J. H. B. Hall Papers, Maps and Manuscript Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History. John W. Jones, *Christ in the Camp* (Richmond: B. F. Johnson and Co., 1887), pp. 227-8. *Southern Presbyterian*, October 5, 1861. *Journal of the Proceedings of an Adjourned Meeting of the 30th Annual Convention of the P.E. Church, in the Diocese of Alabama . . . 21st November, 1861* (Montgomery: Montgomery Advertiser Book and Job Office, 1863), pp. 96-7. Typed reminiscence of Henry Donnelly Moore, in Moore Family Biographical Folder, Alabama State Library. Manuscript Addendum, undated, in Bishop H. C. Lay Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

⁴⁷ *Journal of the 68th Annual Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Virginia* (Richmond: 1863), p. 86. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

⁴⁸ *South Western Baptist*, February 5, 1862.

columns of the *Richmond Whig* to plead with the people of that city to furnish him with at least 100 pairs of shoes and 500 pairs of socks.⁴⁹

Some chaplains adopted the practice of acquainting themselves with all of the men in their units and corresponding with their churches, giving news of their members in the army and requesting prayers. In addition to this, the chaplains kept a minute record not only of the names of the members of the regiment but also of all information about them that could be of assistance in saving the sinner or in sanctifying the believer.⁵⁰

Whenever possible the chaplains undertook the painful duty of informing anxious relatives of the death of their loved ones. These letters usually acquainted the receiver with the events connected with the death and in some instances conveyed the last words of a departed soldier. In all cases the chaplain tried to console the relatives by instilling in them the belief that they would all meet in a happy hereafter.⁵¹

A few members of the clergy undertook missions that demanded their services in foreign lands. Chaplain Kensey J. Stewart went to London to have a Confederate Prayer Book published. The printed edition was sent to the Confederacy on board a blockade runner. A Federal warship captured the vessel and, with the possible exception of a few hundred books, the whole cargo was thrown into the sea.⁵² In 1863 Father John Bannon, Chaplain of Price's Brigade, was sent on a secret presidential mission to Rome. He was instructed, by Jefferson Davis, to seek an interview with the Pope and to influence him to recognize the Confederacy. Father Bannon was unsuccessful. Unable to re-enter the Confederacy, he received authorization from President Davis to go to Ireland, where he spent the remainder of his life.⁵³

After serving with his unit for a period of time, the chaplain soon found that one of the vexing problems he had to solve concerned his duties during time of battle. Many a letter to the editor, dealing with the

⁴⁹ Nicholas A. Davis, *Campaign from Texas to Maryland* (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication of the Confederate States, 1863), p. 13.

⁵⁰ Randolph H. McKim, *A Soldier's Recollections* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910), pp. 219-21. *Southern Christian Advocate*, March 3, 1864. *Southern Presbyterian*, March 19, 1863.

⁵¹ Typed copy of a letter from Chaplain L. W. Hasluss to Mrs. Whatley, August 1, 1864, in Military Records Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History. Manuscript letter, Chaplain William Powers to Mrs. Mary J. Newsom, October 1, 1864, Manuscript Department, Duke University Library. Manuscript letter, Acting Chaplain William C. Williams to Bolling Hall, Sr., Hall Papers, Maps and Manuscript Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History. Manuscript letter, W. G. Hall to Marshall C. Newberry, in Newberry Letters, in possession of Bertha H. Harbor, Oxford, Mississippi.

⁵² Reverend G. MacLaren Brydon, "The Confederate Prayer Book," article in possession of Reverend G. M. Brydon, Richmond, Virginia.

⁵³ Albert C. Danner, "Father Bannon's Secret Mission," *Confederate Veteran*, XXVIII (May, 1920), p. 180.

duties and the place of the chaplain during battle, appeared in the columns of religious papers. A "wounded chaplain" chided his brethren for shirking front line duty. He believed that in a majority of the cases a chaplain's presence was required near the lines, so that he could expose himself and show his men that he was not afraid. This minister said that if a chaplain is "suspected of timidity he loses all influence." This he knew, for he had heard the unfavorable comments of officers and men regarding those clerics who did not hazard their lives in battle.⁵⁴ A number of chaplains concurred in this belief and insisted on fighting in the lines.⁵⁵

The *Southern Churchman*, quoting the *Religious Herald*, advised the chaplain not to be so imprudent as to expose himself unnecessarily to danger. For, if he were killed or wounded or captured, it would inevitably be some time before a successor could be chosen, and thus the whole regiment would be left for months without spiritual ministrations.⁵⁶ In the final analysis each was usually guided by the opinion of his regiment regarding his station and duties during time of battle.

Some chaplains occasionally took an active part in the fighting. One such was the Reverend James Sinclair, Fifth North Carolina Regiment, who, at the battle of Manassas, acted as lieutenant colonel. Sinclair led a number of charges, and at the close of the engagement General James Longstreet expressed his gratitude, presenting the good chaplain with a sabre which had been captured from the enemy and inviting him to occupy a position on his staff.⁵⁷

In the battle of Chancellorsville Chaplain W. G. Curry found himself and one soldier surrounded by the enemy. They made a run for it, but presently his comrade was hit. Curry ran to the help of his companion, lifted him up, and carried him back to his own unit. At that moment he did not realize that his act of gallantry had saved not only the wounded soldier's life but also his own. The enemy had been so moved by his conduct that they had ceased to fire.⁵⁸

Another "fighting chaplain" was the Reverend I. T. Tichenor, Seventeenth Alabama Regiment.⁵⁹ He killed a Federal colonel, a major, and four privates.⁶⁰ The chaplain received a slight flesh wound in this

⁵⁴ *Southern Churchman*, August 8, 1862.

⁵⁵ Percy L. Rainwater (ed.), *A Civilian's Recollections of the War Between the States*—H. S. Fulkerson, 1886 (Baton Rouge: Otto Claitor, 1939), p. 133. *Religious Herald*, May 1, 1862. *South Western Baptist*, May 1, 1862. *Religious Herald*, May 8, 1862.

⁵⁶ *Southern Churchman*, July 18, 1862.

⁵⁷ *Southern Presbyterian*, August 10, 1861.

⁵⁸ Newspaper clipping in the Curry Family Biographical Folder, Alabama Department of Archives and History.

⁵⁹ Reverend B. F. Riley, *History of the Baptists of Alabama* (Birmingham: Roberts and Son, 1895), p. 287.

⁶⁰ *Religious Herald*, May 1, 1862.

action, but other chaplains, similarly engaged in battle, suffered more severely.⁶¹

Chaplain (later Bishop) John C. Granberry, Eleventh Virginia Regiment, insisted on staying at the front with his men.⁶² At the battle of Malvern Hill, he was badly wounded and was left on the field for dead. He later recovered, but lost permanently the sight of one eye.⁶³ Reverend George G. Smith, chaplain of Phillips' Georgia Legion, was shot through the neck at the battle of South Mountain;⁶⁴ Reverend L. H. Jones was severely wounded in the battle of Glorietta while "bending with a white flag in his hand over the body of a dying soldier."⁶⁵

After one of the bloody skirmishes of the battle of Spotsylvania, Chaplain William B. Owen, Seventeenth Mississippi Regiment, had removed from the field the wounded on both sides, had taken note of the dead of his regiment, and was gathering addresses of the Federal dead when his left elbow was shattered by a minie ball. He was rushed to the field hospital where his elbow was resectioned, but his resistance had been lowered by privation in camp and by ceaseless labor. The wound proved fatal.⁶⁶

Father Blieml, chaplain, Tenth Tennessee Regiment, was killed at Jonesboro, Georgia, while administering the last sacrament to a dying officer.⁶⁷ At the battle of Corinth, Chaplain William M. Vanderhurst, Sixth Texas Cavalry, went into the charge with his unit and was killed in the slaughter which followed.⁶⁸ A chaplain Weller fell at Shiloh in the discharge of his duties.⁶⁹ At Monett's Ferry, B. F. Ellison, chaplain to Madison's Regiment, was mortally wounded.⁷⁰

These chaplains participated in the hostilities. Others were stationed in the infirmaries; some were in charge of ambulances; still others supervised the litter bearers in battle.⁷¹ Yet, regardless of how well or how poorly a chaplain performed his duties, he could not help being subjected to a considerable amount of criticism. It would appear from the letters and writings of the officers and enlisted men in the Confederate

⁶¹ *South Western Baptist*, May 1, 1862.

⁶² W. M. Seay, "Bishop John C. Granberry, A Fighting Parson," *Confederate Veteran*, XVIII (July, 1910), p. 322.

⁶³ William H. Morgan, *Personal Reminiscences of the War of 1861-65* (Lynchburg: J. P. Bell Co., 1911), p. 137.

⁶⁴ Wilbur F. Hinman (compiler), *Camp and Field*. (Cleveland: N. G. Hamilton Co., 1892), p. 138.

⁶⁵ *Southern Churchman*, June 20, 1862. *Church Intelligencer*, June 13, 1862.

⁶⁶ Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (New York: Neale Publishing Co., 1923), p. 143. *Southern Christian Advocate*, June 9, 1864.

⁶⁷ J. Pinkney Thompson, "Chaplain of Tenth Tennessee Regiment," *Confederate Veteran*, XXI (December, 1913), p. 593.

⁶⁸ *Confederate Veteran*, XXIII (May, 1925), p. 205.

⁶⁹ *Southern Churchman*, June 20, 1862. *Church Intelligencer*, June 13, 1862.

⁷⁰ O. R., 1, XXXIV, part 1, p. 620.

⁷¹ Stiles, *op. cit.*, p. 143. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 522.

army that they were as vociferous in their condemnation of his work, or lack of work, as they were in their praise of it.

The Confederate soldier often accused his chaplain of forsaking him during the winter months for more palatable food and a warmer bed. This accusation seems somewhat justified when we examine the numerous requests from chaplains for a transfer from the field to a post during the winter months.

Chaplain L. H. Baldwin, Fifth Louisiana Volunteers, thought that he would be "more useful" at a post in Monroe, Louisiana, than in his regiment over the winter of 1862-63.⁷² Reverend George H. Denny, Fiftieth Virginia, felt that a winter spent at a post would give him the time necessary to prepare sermons as well as to recover from "exposure."⁷³ Chaplain Denny's request was granted, but in May, 1864, he again found his health "feeble," and, since his regiment had been captured, he asked assignment to a post, which was granted.⁷⁴ The Reverend C. H. Atwood, Fifth Alabama Infantry Regiment, believed he could do more good at a post in Union Town, Alabama, where his wife and family recently had moved.⁷⁵

Since it was primarily through the medium of preaching that the chaplain came into contact with the Confederate warrior, it was only natural that his reputation in the army should depend to a great extent upon his oratorical ability and the fervor with which he expounded the Word of God. As far as the soldier was concerned, preaching was the all-important thing, and when he found that his chaplain was not a good platform performer, he was disappointed and disgusted. He might express his feelings by refusing to attend services or by criticizing the chaplain in his diary or in a letter home.⁷⁶ One soldier told his folks: "If we had a good preacher I think we would have good times. We have a chaplain by the name of Tracy, but he can't preach much."⁷⁷

It was very difficult for a chaplain to give complete satisfaction in his preaching, for his regiment was composed of such a heterogeneous group

⁷² Manuscript letter, Chaplain L. H. Baldwin to Seddon, December 10, 1862, War Department Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁷³ Manuscript letter, Chaplain George H. Denny to Cooper, November 2, 1863, Adjutant General Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁷⁴ Manuscript letter, Chaplain George H. Denny to Cooper, May 26, 1864, Adjutant General Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁷⁵ Manuscript letter, Chaplain C. H. Atwood to Cooper, March 11, 1864, Adjutant General Office File, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁷⁶ Richard Lewis, *Camp Life of a Confederate Boy* (Charleston: News and Courier Book Presses, 1883), p. 11. Manuscript Diary of James J. Kirkpatrick, Archives Collection, University of Texas Library, entry of August 15, 1863.

⁷⁷ Manuscript letter, William R. Stilwell to Mrs. Stilwell, May 13, 1863, in "Letters of Confederate Soldiers," V (unnumbered page), Georgia Department of Archives and History.

that they had different views regarding preaching.⁷⁸ Many men wanted a roaring sermon, with the preacher shouting and exhorting them to mend their ways or face hell-fire and damnation. Lieutenant Josiah Ryland criticized the sermons of Chaplain W. E. Wiatt when he wrote: "Wiatt preached in Captain Marshall's tent, on the passion of Christ. I cannot enjoy his sermons, he is so lifeless."⁷⁹ A few Sundays later he still did not like Wiatt's sermons and expressed the opinion that they would be much better "if he would only let go." But either Wiatt improved or the lieutenant changed his standards for seven months later he wrote: "went over to hear Wiatt, who stirred up my dull, cold heart. I think him one of our best Chaplains."⁸⁰

A few chaplains were accused of being prejudiced or one-sided in their views⁸¹ and of delivering dissertations on politics instead of preaching the gospel.⁸² Two of them were charged with gross ignorance on Biblical questions and one,⁸³ by his apparent lack of education, so disgusted a surgeon that he complained: "we had preaching Sunday and again today I got enough on Sunday in about fifteen minutes to last me during the campaign — he is a whale all but the oil — he pronounced servile, *servile* parental *parentual* — said *have come* and etc. Friday he gave the boys a regular ront."⁸⁴

But the Confederate soldier did write some words of praise. A Louisianian declared that Reed, chaplain of the Fifth Louisiana Regiment, was a "magnificent preacher."⁸⁵ A member of the Sixth Virginia Regiment praised Chaplain John C. Granbury as a preacher of fine sermons.⁸⁶ Chaplain George Patterson, an Episcopalian, received similar commendations from one of his hearers.⁸⁷ Elias Davis believed that he had heard sermons as good as those preached by Parson Renfroe of the Fourteenth Alabama Regiment, but never had he heard "one person

⁷⁸ Photostat of a manuscript, Dr. E. P. Becton to Mrs. Becton, October 26, 1862, Archives Collection, University of Texas Library.

⁷⁹ Typescript diary of Lt. Josiah Ryland, in possession of Dr. Garnett Ryland, University of Richmond, entry of January 26, 1862.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, entry of August 17, 1862.

⁸¹ Manuscript letter, John J. Armfield to Mrs. Armfield, December 25, 1864, Armfield Papers, Archives of the North Carolina Historical Commission.

⁸² Manuscript diary of Captain Cary Whitaker, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, entry of May 2, 1864.

⁸³ Typescript diary of James Hampton Kerrykendall, Archives Collection, University of Texas Library, entry of December 17.

⁸⁴ Typescript copy of a letter, Dr. E. P. Becton to Mrs. Becton, August 12, 1862, Archives Collection, University of Texas Library.

⁸⁵ Typescript copy of a letter, A. Flourney, Jr., to "My Sweet Docy," July 8, 1861, in possession of Dr. Bell I. Wiley, Emory University.

⁸⁶ Manuscript letter, R. C. Mabry to Mrs. Mabry, October 22, 1864, Henry C. Brown Papers, Archives of the North Carolina Historical Commission.

⁸⁷ Manuscript letter, John W. Hanks to Reverend Mr. Webb, August 29, 1863, Webb Letters, Archives of the North Carolina Historical Commission.

preach such a succession of good sermons."⁸⁸

Some chaplains were able to arouse the men by their preaching, and a few accomplished the same end by neglecting to preach. Neill J. McLaughlin of Company K, Thirty-eighth North Carolina Regiment, was very much disturbed at having heard only one sermon since he left home. He wondered if the chaplain felt that the soldiers were all too good to need preaching.⁸⁹ "Our Chaplain is with us but doesn't preach often," complained A. S. Webb; "I don't think he is accomplishing much good in this regiment. I believe a Methodist or Baptist would do much more good."⁹⁰ The Confederate soldiers were especially bitter toward the chaplain when he left them in the trenches for long periods of time without attempting to bring them the Word of God.⁹¹

Sectarianism undoubtedly influenced the feelings of some Confederate soldiers regarding their chaplains. Colonel William Pender, an Episcopalian, could not understand how his chaplain, a Methodist, could be so "childish." The chaplain, suffering from a cold, fretted and worried so about his illness that he finally went to Petersburg to try to recover. This action on the part of the minister indicated to his commanding officer that he was lacking in Christian fortitude and resignation. The colonel expressed the belief that he would soon resign; and if the chaplain did so, he intended to recommend an Episcopalian, on the grounds that there were already too many Methodist chaplains.⁹²

If the chaplain sat by, idly drawing his pay and doing nothing, he was certain to be condemned by the men and some of the officers. If, on the other hand, he was very assiduous and preached often about death, damnation, and against swearing, drinking and gambling, he would soon be referred to as "the scourge of the army." His commanding officer would accuse him of making men unfit for battle by awaking in them fear of retribution.⁹³ One hapless chaplain who delivered a sermon against swearing found himself at the mercy of his commanding officer. The colonel charged him with "having taken advantage of his position to

⁸⁸ Manuscript letter, Elias Davis to Mrs. Davis, August 14, 1863, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina. Manuscript letter, J. M. Simpson to his Mother, James Simpson Collection, Manuscript Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History.

⁸⁹ Manuscript letter, Neill J. McLaughlin to "Parson," April 11, 1862, Manuscript Department, Duke University Library.

⁹⁰ Manuscript letter, A. S. Webb to his brother, August 8, 1863, Webb Letters, Archives of the North Carolina Historical Commission.

⁹¹ Manuscript letter, J. B. Mitchell to his father, September 1, 1863, Mitchell Papers, Manuscript Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History.

⁹² Manuscript letter, William D. Pender to Mrs. Pender, October 29, 1861, Pender Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.

⁹³ *Religious Herald*, July 17, 1862. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-30.

lecture him on swearing," and as a result would not hear him preach again.⁹⁴

One officer who refused to provide his men with a chaplain opposed having divine worship in camp because it disturbed those who did not wish to hear it. He believed that the proper place for church services was out in the woods.⁹⁵ Of course, such an attitude was the exception rather than the rule; most officers, even though they might be irreligious, tried to obtain a chaplain, believing that he would promote efficiency in their unit.⁹⁶

Constant criticism coupled with the earthy influence of camp life caused the chaplain to feel a need for association with his brother-chaplains. This need led to the establishment of Chaplain's Associations in brigades, corps, and even armies throughout the Confederate forces.⁹⁷ There is no definite evidence as to which association was the first to organize or as to the person who first conceived the idea of such an organization; it was said, however, that General Robert E. Lee originated the Chaplain's Association in his army, and it is a matter of record that he was in frequent attendance at its meetings.⁹⁸

These associations had regular officers and regular meetings⁹⁹ in which they exchanged experiences and discussed happenings of general interest to all.¹⁰⁰ Ordinarily at the meetings one chaplain was invited to preach to his fellows; reports were made on the state of religion in each regiment and attempts were made to ascertain the possibility of supplying regiments which had no chaplains.¹⁰¹

A favorite method used by the Association in stating a problem or making a request was the use of formal resolutions and petitions. Especially frequent were requests that the authorities — ranging from the Confederate Congress to a particular general — forbid the holding of reviews, inspections, and parades on the Sabbath.¹⁰² Other resolutions were directed against sectarian preaching.

⁹⁴ *Richmond Christian Advocate*, March 10, 1864.

⁹⁵ *Southern Christian Advocate*, March 10, 1864.

⁹⁶ *Southern Presbyterian*, May 7, 1863 and May 18, 1861.

⁹⁷ Typewritten copy of a letter, Jimmie Simpson to Mrs. Simpson, April 22, 1863, James Simpson Papers, Manuscript Division, Alabama Department of Archives and History. *Christian Advocate*, May 12, 1864 and April 4, 1865. *Army and Navy Messenger*, June 15, 1863. William W. Bennett, *A Narrative of the Great Revival which Prevailed in the Southern Armies* (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen and Haffelfinger, 1877) p. 245.

⁹⁸ *Southern Christian Advocate*, April 21, 1864.

⁹⁹ Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Southern Presbyterian*, December 25, 1862.

¹⁰¹ *Army and Navy Messenger*, February 1, 1864.

¹⁰² *Southern Christian Advocate*, March 17, 1864 and February 25, 1864. Jones, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

As a whole, the chaplain's corps endeavored to provide the army with spiritual leadership and alleviate temporal wants by giving spiritual consolation. A commanding general who believed chaplains to be indispensable was "Stonewall" Jackson. He always aided them and even chastised some chaplains for a lack of spiritual zeal in proportion to the importance of their mission.¹⁰³ However, one chaplain in particular resented such interference on the part of the general with his holy mission.

Jackson had ordered B. T. Lacy to act as superintendent of chaplains in his corps. Reverend Lacy sent word to Chaplain George Patterson of the Third North Carolina Regiment, that, in due time, he expected to visit with and preach to his regiment. When Lacy arrived, Chaplain Patterson questioned his authority and stated that he did not expect him to conduct services in a regiment to which he was the assigned chaplain. Later when Jackson met Chaplain Patterson he inquired as to the latter's motive for refusing to let Lacy preach. The Carolinian looked the general straight in the eye and said: "General Jackson, do you want any one to help you to command this Corps?" "No, Sir," replied Jackson in a determined voice, "I do not." "Well," replied Patterson, "and I don't want anybody to help me to be chaplain of this regiment." Jackson, seeing that here was a chaplain fully cognizant of his duties, said with a smile, "Good morning Mr. Patterson," and rode on.¹⁰⁴

As an individual Reverend George Patterson exemplified conscientious integrity. It cannot be said, however, that either he or his superior qualities were typical of the Confederate chaplain; for, taken all in all the chaplains were neither demigods nor were they rascals. What then would a profile of the average Southern chaplain reveal? Such a portrait would show that most were of middle age, most were Protestant and most of them came from rural backgrounds. Some became chaplains because they wanted to help the men; some joined because they thought it would be a soft job; some joined because their churches forced them into it. Some worked hard at their jobs and were beloved while others shirked their duty and were disliked by their men. Some were heroes and others were cowards. Sometimes, the Confederate chaplain thought of spiritual matters and spiritual needs. Sometimes he thought of material needs — his own. In the final summing up, he was "only human", with all that phrase implies of virtue and the lack of it. Such as he was, the Confederate soldiers needed him. Indeed, they could not have done without him.

¹⁰³ *Southern Christian Advocate*, May 28, 1863.

¹⁰⁴ Joseph B. Cheshire, *The Church in the Confederate States* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), p. 88.

Donald Mark Lynne is the second Annapolis man represented in this issue of Civil War History. He entered the Academy from Fargo, North Dakota and wrote this paper on Gen. Wilson just before receiving his commission in June, 1954. Ensign Lynne is presently on active duty with the United States Navy.

Wilson's Cavalry at Nashville

DONALD M. LYNNE

IN MID-NOVEMBER OF THE YEAR 1864, two great armies which had been locked in combat for months turned their backs on each other, and marched in opposite directions. General Sherman, in command of the National Army of the Cumberland, having signally failed to defeat or neutralize the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, was off on his famous March to the Sea. Behind him, the paramount objective of the campaign just ended, 36,000 strong and still very much a threat to the Union, was being set in motion by its leader, General Hood, for a drive northward into Tennessee.¹

When Sherman cut his communications on November 16th, and forged southward away from Atlanta, responsibility for containing Hood fell to General Thomas. The approaching danger of a Southern offensive was not lost on that officer, who had been in Nashville, building an army, for over a month. The task was a tremendous one, for Sherman had taken the cream of the Federal Western Armies on his excursion across Georgia, leaving Thomas a fragmentary and unprepared force to cope with Hood.

There was an officer on Thomas' staff who was to play a prominent part in the building of the force to face the Southern advance. This man was General James Harrison Wilson, lately transferred from the Army of the Potomac. Grant had sent the young man to Sherman to command his cavalry, with the recommendation that "he would by his personal

¹ John P. Dyer, *The Gallant Hood* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1950), p. 279. John B. Hood, *Advance and Retreat* (New Orleans: Hood Orphan Memorial Fund, 1880), p. 298. Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of the Tennessee* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), pp. 383-4. Thomas B. Van Horne, *The Life of Major-General George H. Thomas* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882), p. 479. The figure used to give the strength of Hood's force is a composite one, made up from the figures given in the sources above.

activity increase the effect of that arm 'fifty per cent'.² But Sherman chose to let the newcomer remain behind in Tennessee, while the veteran Kilpatrick led the Union horse to the sea. Wilson reported to Nashville, assumed command of Thomas' cavalry, and joined in the race against time, and the menacing Hood.

Thomas had only two corps of infantry and not over five thousand cavalymen ready for combat.³ The remaining forces under his command were a heterogeneous lot, scattered all over the West. His most important task was the gathering together of all the troops available into a concentrated army at Nashville.⁴

"Fortunately for us," states Wilson, "Hood lost a whole month at Gadsden, waiting for ammunition, supplies and recruits . . . It was this delay . . . [that] gave Thomas time to assemble all his forces for a sturdy defense."⁵

Wilson, too, faced a problem of consolidation. The cavalry arm in the West was thoroughly dispersed in many widely scattered detachments under three separate army commands. It was without unity of organization, equipment or command, without purpose or power to inflict serious injury upon the enemy. Every army or corps commander had a cavalry escort, and a large number of mounted orderlies. Many of the cavalymen were without mounts, and on detached service.

Wilson relieved the cavalry chiefs in each of the armies, and centered all details of administration at the headquarters of the new corps. "This important step," says Wilson, "gave me direct control over all the cavalry . . . Henceforth, all the mounted troops of the Military Division were absolutely under my control . . ."⁶ The new leader organized a large and efficient staff, commended as the best cavalry staff ever organized up to that time, in every way worthy of imitation.⁷

The young commander had nearly fifty thousand men under him, on paper, but could not raise six thousand for actual service, because of a lack of horses, arms, equipments and because of men absent on detached service. Horses were his greatest shortage. All serviceable mounts in several of Wilson's divisions were given to Kilpatrick's force, so that Sherman would have an effective cavalry command.⁸ To remedy this great lack in transportation, Wilson asked, and was granted permission

² William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1891), II, p. 160.

³ James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1912), II, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷ Colonel Chesney as quoted in Donn Piatt, *General George H. Thomas* (Cincinnati: R. Clarke & Co., 1893), p. 595.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 582.

by Secretary of War Stanton, to impress horses from the civilian population, wherever they could be found. Animals were taken from streetcar firms, livery stables, private owners, and even a traveling circus then in Nashville.⁹

The morale of the cavalry was not good. In the army of the West, it was looked upon as both futile and discreditable. According to Wilson, "the cavalry had come to be a scoff and a byword to the other branches of service. The derisive offer of a liberal reward for a dead cavalryman was just as fair in the West as the East and was heard too often to be regarded as either witty or agreeable . . . It is pleasant to add, however, that neither the reward for a dead cavalryman nor the cry of 'grab a root' was ever heard . . . in the West after the battle of Nashville."¹⁰

Wilson began removing his troopers from escort, picket, and courier duty, forming them into concentrated units for the first time. As the cavalry assumed the makings of a powerful force, the troopers began to feel a pride in their organization, and a belief that in future operations they would be able to give a good account of themselves. Wilson felt that a policy of concentration was the only means of overcoming the enemy's cavalry. He believed cavalry was worthless for defense. Its only power was in a vigorous offensive.¹¹

The young leader was among the first to recognize the possibilities of a new and radical concept in cavalry operations. This was the separation of the cavalry trooper from his horse in actual combat. The era of massed cavalry charges against infantry concentrations was fading, for the increased firepower of the rifle was coming to dominate the vulnerable horse. Wilson understood that the horse should be used mainly as a rapid means of transportation to the position of attack. The actual assault should be made on foot, with the trooper using every means of protection available to screen himself from enemy fire. Cavalry should be highly mobile infantry, and the cavalry trooper essentially an infantryman with four legs.¹² In the Nashville campaign, Wilson was to put his theory to the test, and to find it extremely successful.

Another facet of Wilson's progressive nature was his large scale use of the Spencer repeating carbine. Eventually, about 15,000 of his men were armed with the weapon, "at that time altogether the best military firearm in the world."¹³ The Spencer was new, and had been used but briefly in the Army of the Potomac. However, Wilson recognized its tremendous advantages for cavalry work, and did not rest until his com-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

¹⁰ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹² Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 643.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 595.




FIGURE 1

mand was thoroughly outfitted with the carbine. "Our best officers estimate," wrote Wilson at the close of the campaign, "one man with it is equivalent to three with any other arm."¹⁴ The carbine inspired great confidence, and Wilson's men believed that, with the weapon, they could go anywhere.

But while Wilson organized and equipped, and Thomas called in reinforcements, the sands of time had run out all too quickly. The 19th of November saw Hood on the move, sweeping northward out of Alabama with Forrest's incomparable cavalry on his flanks, hungry for a Southern victory.

From the first, Thomas saw that he could not prevent Hood from striking into Tennessee. His plan was to delay Hood's advance, while not risking a decisive battle, until he had obtained sufficient reinforcements to face the Southern army on favorable terms.¹⁵

Thomas sent General Schofield south to block the Confederates with the available Union troops, which numbered less than two-thirds of Hood's force.¹⁶ During the initial stages of the advance, Hood's progress was hindered by small attacks, mostly by cavalry. Schofield prepared seriously to retard Hood at Pulaski, but the Confederate quickly turned his flank and forced him to fall back on Columbia.

There, with his back against the Duck River, Schofield dug in and planned to make a stand. Wilson, who had left Nashville to take personal charge of the cavalry, posted his units on the Union flanks, to guard against turning movements.

Hood hoped to destroy Thomas' forces separately, before they could be combined.¹⁷ With the complete destruction of his enemy in mind, he tapped at the Union center with artillery, and then, moving fast behind Forrest's cavalry screen, crossed the Duck River east of Columbia at Huey's Mills, turned Schofield's flank, and closed in on his rear at Spring Hill. Wilson, although pressed back by Forrest's superior numbers, accurately reported the flanking movement to Schofield, and advised his immediate retreat.¹⁸ Schofield ignored the warning until it was almost too late. When the Federal commander did commence his withdrawal, a very critical situation developed, for Hood was in a position to throw the mass of his army across the Federal line of communications.

¹⁴ *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, vol. 45, part II, p. 488. All citations to the *Official Records* in this article refer to volume 45; they will be cited as O.R., followed by the part number and page reference.

¹⁵ Henry C. Fletcher, *History of the American Civil War* (London: R. Bentley, 1865-68), III, 417.

¹⁶ John M. Schofield, *Forty-Six Years in the Army* (New York: Century, 1897), p. 258.

¹⁷ Henry Coppee, *General Thomas* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1893), p. 243.

¹⁸ Van Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 280.




FIGURE 2

By all the rules of war, Schofield should have been annihilated by a superior Southern force which had an immense tactical advantage. Only a remarkable series of blunders in the Confederate command saved Schofield, who squeezed through to Franklin by forced marches.

Hood, infuriated at the loss of a truly great opportunity to destroy his adversary, fell upon Schofield at Franklin, determined to drive the Federals into the Harpeth River.¹⁹ In one of the most desperate battles of the war, the Confederate forces were repulsed bloodily from the Union fortified positions with terrible losses. Schofield, having temporarily paralyzed Hood's infantry, began withdrawing his battle-weary men toward Nashville.

A very important phase of the battle was Wilson's successful containment of Forrest's cavalry on the Union left flank. The Confederate cavalryman hurled a part of his command across the Harpeth, attempting to drive into Schofield's rear. But Forrest did not have enough men to cope with Wilson, for Hood had reduced his strength by stationing one of his brigades on the opposite flank, where it saw little action. A biographer of Hood states, "If Forrest with 5,000 men could strike Schofield's retreating columns, tired and worn out from days of marching and a hellish battle, he could literally destroy them. Wilson drove Forrest back, thus shielding his own army, and another golden opportunity was lost."²⁰ One of Thomas' biographers commented that Wilson's troopers were "brilliantly engaged," first in driving Forrest's command back across the Harpeth, and subsequently in foiling all the great Southern leader's attempts to hit the exposed retreating army.²¹ In this action against Forrest's mounted men, the Union troopers, using the Spencer carbine, fought dismounted. Wilson's policy had passed its first big test. Hood, having failed to give Forrest his full striking force, was to learn the great value of cavalry concentration from Wilson two weeks later.

Schofield's tired little army entered Nashville intact, on December 1st. During the retreat, Wilson's cavalry had operated with vigor and effect, closely watching the enemy and accurately reporting every move to Schofield.²² The first phase of the campaign was over.

Hood followed Schofield to Nashville, and dug in around the southern perimeter of the city. His army was in a state of deep depression, as a result of the heavy loss taken at Franklin. A strong attitude of caution motivated the actions of the army, an attitude which was to cost Hood the loss of the offensive in the campaign.²³ His force, situated far from its

¹⁹ Dyer, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

²¹ Van Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

²² Piatt, *op. cit.*, pp. 564-5.

²³ O.R., I, pp. 34-5.

base of supplies, and without sufficient success to draw many volunteers to its ranks, was in a critical position. The Union forces, on the other hand, were well supplied with stores at Nashville, and saw each day more reinforcements coming into the city to strengthen Thomas' army.²⁴

Nashville, the center of rail, river and telegraphic communication for the entire Western theatre of war, was the scene of feverish activity during the first week of December. While Hood sat down outside the city and pondered what to do next, Thomas and Wilson were busy inside the lines, completing the great fighting machine that would crush the Confederate leader and his army, and forever remove the threat of Southern invasion to the Ohio valley.

Wilson set up camp at Edgefield, on the northern bank of the Cumberland River. There he worked to repair the damages of the strenuous retreat, to rest and build up both men and horses, and to mount the great number of troopers who lacked horses. Thomas fully comprehended the value of cavalry, and gave his complete and enthusiastic support to the young officer in preparing his command for the field.²⁵

A number of the cavalry units could not rest. To prevent Hood's crossing of the Cumberland and flanking Nashville, they co-operated with a fleet of Union ironclads in patrolling the river.²⁶

Thomas, now considerably reinforced by General A. J. Smith's command, which had marched all the way across the state of Missouri to join in the defense against Hood, felt secure against attack, but not prepared for offense. He determined to wait behind the earthworks of Nashville until the cavalry could become an effective force. Thomas believed that if Hood did assault Nashville, he would be damaged even more severely than he was at Franklin. Considering the possibility that the Southern leader might not attack, Thomas wrote, "... if he remains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him and will move against him at once."²⁷

Meanwhile, Hood realized the folly of attempting to storm the strengthened fortifications of his opponent. His losses sustained at Franklin, the failure of reinforcements to arrive from other Southern commands, the lack of recruits from the Tennessee area joining his force, and the growing strength of Thomas all caused him to change his tactics. He adopted the plan of waiting for Thomas to seize the offensive. "The only remaining chance of success . . . was to take position . . . and await Thomas' attack which, if handsomely repulsed, might afford us an opportunity to . . . enter the city on the heels of the enemy."²⁸

²⁴ Fletcher, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

²⁵ Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

²⁶ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

²⁷ O.R., II, p. 3.

²⁸ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

A stalemate developed. This stalemate caused a considerable amount of consternation in Washington, where Generals Grant and Halleck were eying Hood with great concern. They did not realize that Hood planned to remain right where he was. Rather, they expected the Confederate commander to by-pass Nashville, and lead Thomas on a "foot race" north to the Ohio River.²⁹

A large number of telegrams was sent to Thomas, urging him to strike the enemy immediately, and remove the danger. But Thomas would not budge until he had sufficient cavalry. "I do not think it prudent," wrote the Union leader to Grant on December 6th, "to attack Hood with less than six thousand cavalry to cover my flanks . . ."³⁰

The pressure grew stronger. Grant, usually calm and unruffled even under the most desperate circumstances, seemed to experience panic. He exhibited signs of great anxiety as Thomas continued his deliberate preparations for action.³¹

On December 9th, Grant, fearing Thomas was too cautious, requested Halleck to place Schofield in command at Nashville. Halleck, however, refused to take the responsibility, and Thomas remained in charge of the army facing Hood.³²

While Thomas attempted to convince his superiors that the delays were entirely necessary, an important development had taken place in the Confederate camp. Hood had detached the major portion of his cavalry strength southeast to Murfreesboro, to reduce the Union garrison there. Wilson severely criticized this maneuver, since it forced Forrest to ride out at the critical stage of the campaign.³³

On December 9th, Wilson, having accomplished in a few days the ordinary labor of months, was ready for combat.³⁴ The cavalry had been organized into a powerful, compact, and efficient force. The officers and men felt that the time of ineffectual operations was past, and with a new confident spirit, looked forward to the opportunity to prove their mettle.

Thomas, now satisfied that his army was prepared for battle, made plans to advance on the enemy the following day. But the forces of nature stepped across his path in the form of a freezing storm of sleet and snow. For several days the country was covered with a sheet of ice, making the land more suitable for skating than for combat movements.³⁵

Thomas postponed the assault, waiting for the weather to clear. Again,

²⁹ O.R., II, p. 97.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

³¹ Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 568.

³² Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-90.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-20.

³⁴ Coppee, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

³⁵ Richard W. Johnson, *Memoir of Major-General George H. Thomas* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1881), p. 181.

he was subjected to a barrage of orders from Washington, calling for immediate movement against Hood and again he refused to move until conditions were favorable.

On the 14th, the inclement weather moderated, and Thomas primed his army for the long awaited offensive to be initiated early the following day.

Dense fog covered the ground on the morning of the 15th, which, although it screened the initial Union movements, delayed the actual assault. A second delay was forced upon the cavalry when Smith's infantry, contrary to plan, marched across their front instead of their rear.³⁶ The postponing of the assault on that December day probably prevented the complete defeat of the Confederates.

Union General Steedman opened the action by making a heavy demonstration on the right of Hood's line. Thomas hoped to confuse Hood by this feint, while Wilson's troopers and Smith's infantry struck the primary blow on the Confederate left flank. Wilson made a wide circuit around the enemy's left, checked the defending cavalry under General Chalmers with only a part of his force, and directed the remainder against the flank and rear of the Southern line, while the Union infantry directly assaulted in front. The troopers drove the enemy back steadily; in the words of Thomas, "... the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works; ... they reached the position simultaneously. . . ."³⁷ The coordination was so effective that each force claimed the guns and prisoners taken in the advance. The Confederate left wing folded before the spirited attack, and Thomas ordered a general advance along his whole line.

Hood, his left flank broken, and his center and right under strong pressure, was driven from his defenses and forced to retreat several miles rearward to an entirely new position in the Brentwood Hills. The early arrival of darkness prevented the action from being a decisive Union victory. But there was still plenty of fight left in Hood, and he worked throughout the night to prepare a rugged defense against further attacks from Thomas on the following day.

Of the first day's action, Wilson wrote, "for the first time on any American battlefield all the available mounted force, a full army corps in strength, were massed on the flank of an advancing army, making a turning movement of the first importance against an enemy occupying a strongly fortified position."³⁸ For the first time, the cavalry horse had been used merely as a mobile vehicle to carry the trooper to the battlefield. The actual charge saw the trooper transformed into an infantryman, able to invest the enemy's fortifications.

³⁶ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-10.

³⁷ O.R., I, pp. 38-9.

³⁸ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 112.




FIGURE 3

The next day found Wilson's cavalry in a position from which it could renew the attack on the Confederate left and rear with fatal effect. The cavalry leader was ordered to apply pressure upon this area with all his force, at the earliest possible hour.³⁹ Again, Wilson swung his cavalry around Hood's left, dismounted them, and sent them into the Confederate rear. The cavalymen seized the Granny White Pike, one of the two pikes the Confederates could use if forced to retreat. Hood realized the peril to his communications, and ordered Chalmers to hold the pike "at all hazards." But Chalmers and his horsemen, under heavy attack, were "forced back in some disorder" by Wilson's troopers.⁴⁰ The dismounted cavalymen advanced consistently, and by noon had established a position parallel with the enemy line, and facing Nashville.⁴¹

Thomas, in the meantime, was applying pressure upon Hood's front. A heavy artillery bombardment harassed the center, while Steedman's infantry brigades struck on the right. But the Confederate line held its ground against the attack. Hood, noting the repulse of Steedman, believed that the battle was proceeding favorably, and that a victory over Thomas was still possible. But these hopes began to fade as the Union cavalry drove deeper into his left flank.

Hood sent a courier to Chalmers, telling him, "for God's sake to drive the Yankee cavalry from our left and rear or all is lost."⁴² But Chalmers was already submerged, and the Union cavalry came swinging north against the Confederate line, overrunning position after position, their spirit increasing at each advance. Hood played his last card, and drew men from his units facing the Federal infantry to form a new line facing south, backs to his front, to stop Wilson.⁴³

As Southern resistance increased, Wilson began sending staff officers to Thomas and Schofield, urging them to order a general assault. But no major effort was made to support his movement. Thomas, always a deliberate man, was holding his most powerful blow until he felt the exact moment for loosing it had arrived.

In a burst of impatience, Wilson rode the long circuit around the flanks of the two armies, seeking his general. He found Thomas with Schofield, watching the action. The young cavalryman pointed out the favorable conditions for an attack. From where they stood, units of his force could be seen investing the Confederate works. Wilson urged that he only needed reinforcements to roll back and crush Hood's line. Thomas calmly raised his field glasses and surveyed the scene with great

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴⁰ *O.R.*, I, p. 766.

⁴¹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ John D. Cox, *The March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896), p. 122.

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

4 PM, 16 DECEMBER, 1864

Wilson's dismounted cavalry continues turning movement initiated on first day. Confederate resistance is weakened by infiltrating attack.

↑
NASHVILLE

FRANKLIN
↓



Thomas orders assault along entire line. Hood's left flank caught between two fires, and crumbles under strong pressure, front and rear. Hood's entire army breaks, and the retreat southward commences.

FIGURE 4

deliberation. Then he quietly turned to Schofield and ordered an immediate attack. The Union line rushed forward, and the Confederate left, under intense pressure from both front and rear, broke in full and disorderly retreat. The panic spread rapidly, and in a few minutes Hood's entire army was streaming southward.⁴⁴ John Bell Hood, the "Lion of the South," said: "... I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate Army abandon the field in confusion."⁴⁵

Wilson hurried his men back to their waiting mounts, and hurled them on horseback after the fleeing enemy. Darkness again fell to protect Hood, but this time it could not save him. For although the night was so dark that the Union troopers could hardly see beyond their horses' ears, they went after the Confederates in headlong pursuit.

Chalmers, trying to gain time, set up a barricade on the Granny White Pike several miles behind the original line of battle, while the infantry fled to the rear. Wilson's flying men carried it with a spirited charge in one of the fiercest hand-to-hand fights of the war. The scattered Confederate rearguard attempted to regroup and dig in, but, in the words of Wilson, "... the headlong rush ... broke line after line, carried layout after layout, captured gun after gun, and finally drove Chalmers and his gallant horsemen from the field, in hopeless rout and confusion."⁴⁶

Onward into the night rode the Federal squadrons, driving after Hood's stricken force. One of Hood's commanders stated, "our cavalry was driven on in confusion by the enemy who at once commenced a most vigorous pursuit, his cavalry charging at every opportunity and in the most daring manner. It was apparent that they were determined to make the retreat a rout."⁴⁷ The Confederate columns were penetrated again and again by the remorseless cavalymen, who continued to charge whenever they saw an enemy. The absence of Forrest with the main body of the Southern cavalry was sorely felt. Forrest was too far removed at Murfreesboro to come immediately to the aid of Hood.

That night, moving south on the Granny White Pike, Wilson was hailed by a horseman. It was Thomas. The great leader jubilantly cried to his lieutenant, "Dang it to hell, Wilson, didn't I tell you we could lick 'em?"⁴⁸ For Thomas, the long ordeal was ended. His victory had been won.

But for the men of Hood's army, the ordeal had just begun. The Union pursuit did not cease until midnight, when the troopers had been fighting for eighteen hours. At dawn, it was resumed once more. Wilson's

⁴⁴ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-7.

⁴⁵ Hood, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

⁴⁶ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴⁷ S. D. Lee, "Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee's Report of the Tennessee Campaign," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, III (January-June, 1887), p. 70.

⁴⁸ As quoted in Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

cavalry encountered a strong rearguard north of Franklin at Hollowtree Gap. Thomas states, "the position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried. . ."⁴⁹ However, the impedance of the rearguard forced Wilson to advance in a full front, thus losing precious time in the pursuit.

The remnants of Hood's army then fell back rapidly through Franklin. A possible defense of the Harpeth river crossing was prevented by the flanking advance of one of Wilson's divisions on the south side of the stream, which forced Hood to retire. In some open fields south of Franklin, late in the evening of the 17th, the Confederates attempted another stand. Forrest had returned, and had assumed command of the rearguard. But the great Southern leader, destined to play a defensive role for the remainder of the war, could not stem the tide of Union advance. Wilson pressed back his flanks with dismounted men, and broke his center with a sabre charge by his personal body guard. Forrest's scattered command took refuge in darkness.⁵⁰

On the 18th, Wilson pushed on as far as Columbia. Hood had planned to intrench there, and end the retreat. But his command was so shaken by defeat and resulting pursuit that he was forced to set the broad Tennessee River, eighty miles further south, as his goal.⁵¹

Due to heavy rains, the whole country was inundated, and the roads were almost impassable. The Confederates destroyed their bridges as they went, but the Union soldiers rebuilt them and continued the chase. The delays mounted, the inclement weather aiding Hood in his retreat. But Thomas was determined to continue the pursuit. With Wood's corps of infantry marching on the pikes, and Wilson's cavalry sweeping the flanks across the fields, the Federals continued to press upon their foe.

Forrest, as he retreated, formed a powerful rearguard made up of detachments from all of Hood's command. Thomas, speaking of the pursuit, said, "with the exception of his rearguard his [Hood's] army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble. The rearguard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last."⁵²

On the 23rd the Duck River was crossed. At Lynnville and Buford's Station, Confederate stands were dislodged. On the 25th, Forrest evacuated Pulaski, with Wilson right behind him. The pace was grueling. "The cavalry had moved so rapidly," reported Thomas, "as to outdistance the trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy."⁵³ On the 28th, when Thomas learned from Wilson that the

⁴⁹ O.R., I, p. 41.

⁵⁰ Van Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 351. Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-2.

⁵¹ Robert S. Henry's "First with the Most" Forrest (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944), p. 412.

⁵² O.R., I, p. 42.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

remnants of Hood's command had succeeded in crossing the Tennessee, he called the Union forces to a halt. The most devastating pursuit in American history had come to an end.

At no other time in the war had a victorious commander exerted so much energy in pursuing a defeated army so far. The Federal forces had continued the chase for more than one hundred miles under the handicap of poor weather conditions. The result was a Confederate army so damaged and demoralized that, as an effective unit, it was virtually annihilated. "It was a pursuit unparalleled for its difficulties, and unequaled in its results," wrote one historian, "since it completed the destruction of an army."⁵⁴ The Army of the Tennessee would never again resume the offensive. The veteran command had suffered staggering losses in men and equipment, and the morale of those that returned from Nashville had suffered an irreparable blow.

Sound the death knell for the Confederacy in the West. It only remained for Wilson to hurl his self-contained cavalry commands deep into the Southern states in masses that the weary Confederates could not repulse. The war in the West was over.

The Union cavalry had played an important part in the Nashville campaign. Throughout all three phases, Hood's advance northward, the battle of Nashville, and the consequent pursuit of the defeated Confederates, Wilson's command was a decisive factor.

When Hood first threw his weight into Tennessee, the Union cavalry was before him to harass his advance, and thoroughly scout his movements. At Franklin, Wilson's men gave a hint of things to come when, dismounted, they met and turned back the heretofore irresistible Forrest, thus maintaining the Federal line of communications open to Nashville. At the end of the long retreat, the Union cavalymen had the satisfaction of knowing they had played a prominent role in delaying the Southern advance, and in maintaining the defending army intact as an effective fighting unit.

When Hood was shaken from his position in the Brentwood Hills by Thomas' attack, the Union cavalry fell on him and hurled him southward in a retreat that shattered his command to insignificance. Hood never had a chance to regroup his force, never was able to dig in and stand against the onslaught of Wilson's horsemen. Only the gallant and determined rearguard saved the remnants of his army from total destruction. Wilson and his tireless troopers had given the Union the finest pursuit of the war.

However, the phase which deserves the most attention is the actual battle of Nashville. In this remarkable action, the operation of the cavalry

⁵⁴ Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 574.

is the outstanding feature. One author wrote, "cavalry had never before been employed so admirably and effectively in a great battle."⁵⁵

The task of the cavalry in both days of action was to turn the Confederate left flank. On the first day, in their wheeling maneuver, the troopers captured a considerable number of guns and prisoners, and strongly influenced Hood's retirement to the Brentwood Hills. At nightfall, they were in a position from which, on the following day, a crippling blow could be struck upon the enemy that would give the Union army almost certain victory.⁵⁶

The blow, on the second day, proved to be fatal to Hood.

The turning movement of Wilson's cavalry rendered it impossible for Hood to hold his position, or to make an effective resistance to the [infantry] assault which Thomas ordered, and which put an end to the battle. Had it not been for this turning movement, Hood could and doubtless would have held his intrenchments against the direct assaults of the infantry.⁵⁷

The removal of Forrest from the field before Nashville during the critical period of the campaign was a costly tactical error. Certainly the temporary loss of the great cavalryman and a large portion of his command considerably weakened Hood's army. Wilson speculated that had Forrest been present when the Union cavalry advanced, "he could have made a better and more stubborn defense than that made by Chalmers and Ector alone."⁵⁸ Whether or not Forrest could have held the Confederate line against the Union attack is a question that can never be answered with certainty. However, the combination of favorable factors which Wilson co-ordinated in his force, all of which gave it an exceptional calibre exceeding that of any other force of its day, seem to point to a Union success even though the redoubtable Forrest had been present to dispute the field.

First among the favorable factors was the improvement of morale. Wilson was able to remove the stigma of futility from the cavalry, and instill in that arm the determination and confidence necessary for victory. The ability of the troopers to forge ahead and overcome every obstacle of Southern resistance attests to the great desire of the Union cavalryman to prove his worth in combat.

A second factor was the Spencer carbine, and its effective use by Wilson's command. The infiltrating cavalry was able to pour a heavy and deadly fire into the Confederate rear with the new repeating weapon, and so weaken Hood's line that, when attacked by infantry in front, it collapsed almost immediately.

⁵⁵ Van Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁵⁶ Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 586.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 588.

⁵⁸ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

The large force organized by Wilson for use against the Confederates was another reason for success. Efficiently armed and directed, the power of this force was felt acutely by Hood. Wilson was not content with a command which was merely capable of scouting and picket duties. He desired, and obtained a cavalry arm which could throw a heavy punch, and could rock the enemy in numbers which could not be repulsed. The achievements of Wilson's corps at Nashville stand as the justification of all the efforts that had been made to give it strength, and fully compensated for Thomas' delay in assuming the offensive.

Side by side with the building of a large force was the concentration of that force into a single combatant command. There was no frittering away of cavalry strength at Nashville. The command operated as an integral unit, its entire strength hurled upon a single portion of the enemy's line. Here was the concept of mass and concentration, used with devastating effect upon the enemy.

The basic mission of the cavalry at Nashville was of a different nature than that conventionally given to the mounted arm. Wilson's command, instead of being utilized to protect the exposed infantry wings of the army, or held in reserve to exploit an enemy retreat, was given the opportunity to drive the enemy from a strong defensive position. The operations of the cavalry were not subsidiary to the other commands in Thomas' army. Rather, the turning movement of the cavalry was the keystone of the attack. The success of the entire battle hung on the operations of Wilson's corps. This was the vigorous offensive which Wilson had hoped his command would be given.

In connection with the change in function of the cavalry was the conservation of that arm until the decisive blow was to be struck against Hood. Chalmers, Forrest's lieutenant, made this statement:

At Nashville, our enemy had a large force of cavalry, but instead of wasting its strength in the front, he kept it quietly in the rear of his infantry, resting and recruiting, until the time for action came, and then he moved it out fresh and vigorous with telling effect.⁵⁰

Another condition for the victory at Nashville was the exceptional degree of coordination between the cavalry and the infantry. The two struck Hood's left simultaneously on the first day, working together throughout the advance with a fine display of teamwork. It was the combined attack of the infantry on the front, and the cavalry in the rear, which broke the spirit of the Confederate line on the second day. In comparison, the Union infantry on Hood's right, which had no direct help from the cavalry, could not inflict serious damage upon the foe. Hood's command on that flank stood its ground firmly, until the panic

⁵⁰ O.R., II, p. 758.

resulting from the collapse of the left spread throughout the entire Southern army. "The great victory was gained by the proper cooperation of cavalry, infantry and artillery, all working in harmony to carry out the plans of Thomas."⁶⁰

Last, but most important, was the radical tactic of dismounting the troopers, once they had arrived at the attack area, and having them rush the enemy intrenchments on foot. The irresistible troopers demonstrated thoroughly the mobility and striking power of this type of operation. They literally rode rings around Hood's left flank on horseback, getting into position to strike the weak point of his defense. Then, as infantrymen, they succeeded in fighting their way through every Southern effort at resistance. The large range of operation, the rapidity of movement, and the potent power at the objective gave Wilson's command the highest degree of flexibility of any military force available at that time.

"... Wilson's forces, mounted and dismounted," wrote an author in 1882, "established a precedent for the fighting of cavalry which may be the prophecy of a complete revolution in the methods and operations of that arm."⁶¹

It was a prophecy, for the military movements of the Twentieth Century mirror the initial steps taken by Wilson at Nashville. Today's mobile infantry, able to be transported rapidly to the battlefield by truck and aircraft, is the direct descendant of Wilson's cavalry. Whether the fighting man arrives at the combat area via helicopter, parachute, truck, or horse, the concept is still the same. Use the vehicle for mobility, but let the soldier take advantage of terrain, and attack on foot.

The horse, as a means of military transportation, has long since become outmoded, and the Spencer carbine is now but a museum piece. But Wilson's flexible policy of concentration is still valid today, almost one hundred years after he disabled Hood at Nashville.

⁶⁰ Piatt, *op. cit.*, p. 588.

⁶¹ Van Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

Ode to the North and South

O Jonathan and Jefferson,
Come, listen to my song;
I can't decide, my word upon,
Which of you is most wrong.
I do declare I am afraid
To say which worse behaves,
The North, imposing bonds on Trade,
Or South, that Man enslaves.
And here you are about to fight,
And wage intestine war,
Not either of you in the right;
What simpletons you are!
Too late your madness you will see,
And when your passion cools,
"Snakes!" you will bellow; "how could we
Have been such 'tarnal fools!"
One thing is certain; that if you
Blow out each other's brains,
'Twill be apparent what a few
Each blockhead's skull contains.
You'll have just nothing for your cost,
To show, when all is done.
Greatness and glory you'll have lost
And not a dollar won.
Oh, joined to us by blood, and by
The bond of kindred speech,
And further, by the special tie
Of slang, bound each to each,
All-fired gonies, soft-horn'd pair,
Each other will you lick?
You everlastin' dolts, forbear!
Throw down your arms right slick!
You'll chaw each other up, you two,
Like those Kilkenny cats,
When they had better things to do,
Improvin' off the rats.
Now come, shake hands, together jog
On friendly yet once more;
Whip one another not; and flog
Creation, as before!

—*London Punch*

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The *Other* Gettysburg Address

FRED STRIPP

SUPPOSE YOU HAD LIVED in the United States of America from 1794 to 1865 and that Daniel Webster had likened his half-century of friendship with you to "a long streak of clear, blue, cerulean sky, without cloud, or mist, or haze." Suppose further that Ralph Waldo Emerson had paid tribute to your "radiant beauty of person," your "rich tones . . . precise and perfect utterance . . . the most mellow and beautiful and correct of all the instruments of the time." What if John Adams had written on your behalf a letter of introduction to Thomas Jefferson describing you as "the first literary character" of your age. What if John Quincy Adams had confided to his diary that your orations were "among the best ever delivered in this country" and would "stand the test of time." Imagine that Oliver Wendell Holmes had written a poem in honor of your inauguration as President of Harvard College. Assume that you had been well known to Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, John Quincy Adams, Jackson, Van Buren, Tyler, Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan, and Lincoln. Then picture yourself passing the time of day with Goethe, Byron, Macaulay, and Scott. Think of yourself as Congressman, Senator, and Governor of Massachusetts, Tyler's Ambassador to England, and Fillmore's Secretary of State. Listen to such speakers as Daniel Webster and Wendell Phillips praise you as "the golden mouthed orator." Yet in just ninety years suppose all these others were remembered and you forgotten. And, the final straw, what if references to you were confined chiefly to contrasting unfavorably your two hour speech at Gettysburg with Lincoln's two minute masterpiece! You might have cause to ask the Muse of History for another hearing.

Let it begin at Gettysburg. As the afternoon of November 19, 1863 merged with the eventide, fifteen thousand Americans departed the battlefield. They had dedicated seventeen acres of land as a final resting place for their soldier dead. Had they been asked to name the man

who delivered the Gettysburg Address, their answer would have been unanimous: Edward Everett. Were we to poll fifteen thousand of their descendants on the same question today, with equal unanimity the honor would fall to Abraham Lincoln.

Yet the President had been invited to speak as an afterthought. The committee on arrangements had debated his ability to deliver an address equal to the solemnity of the occasion. It was not decided until two weeks before the ceremony that he should be invited to make the official dedication with "a few appropriate remarks."

Everett, on the other hand, was the unopposed choice of the seventeen State Governors consulted by the committee. So vital was his acceptance that he set the date! Invited on September 23rd to speak on October 23rd, he requested more time to prepare an oration for an occasion so memorable. Governor Curtin accepted the Everett date, November 19th, for the ceremonial of consecration.

Edward Everett, a name to remember! In boyhood he was precocity itself. At 13, valedictorian from Exeter Academy, his original address was in *Latin*. At 17 it was the valedictory at Harvard, the youngest graduate, the highest honors. At 19 he held a post most clergymen would count their ultimate success, the largest, most fashionable, most critical and exacting parish in Boston, Brattle Square Church. While addressing overflow crowds with ninety minute sermons twice each Sunday — earning the nickname, "Ever-at-it" — Harvard College invited him to a full Professorship in Greek before his twenty-first birthday! He accepted but prefaced the teaching with four years of study and travel in Europe, becoming the first American to win a Ph.D. at Göttingen. He commented that his lecture notebooks would be of little use to anyone else, since he "wrote in English, German, French, or Latin as the whim seized him, often changing in the same sentence from one to another."¹

Emerson compared his influence on the youth of Harvard to that of Pericles on the youth of Athens, and at another time spoke fondly of "the inimitable style of our Cicero."²

At age 25 his college duties and many public lectures would seem to provide a full life for any man, but Everett was not just "any man." He accepted the editorship of the *North American Review* with a languishing circulation of five hundred subscribers, built it in four years to twenty-five hundred, contributed fifty articles to elevate its literary

¹ As quoted in Paul Revere Frothingham, *Edward Everett, Orator and Statesman* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925), p. 39.

² *Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, Concord Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1904), X, pp. 330-1. Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes, *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), I, p. 207.

standing, and crowned the whole with a piece on European politics, which it was said a century later could have been written by no other American save Thomas Jefferson.³

He was 30 when his first great oratorical triumph came. Harvard invited him to deliver the Phi Beta Kappa address of 1824. In his audience was the venerable Lafayette, *en famille* at Harvard, or anywhere in America. After charming the audience into delighted silence for two hours on American literature, Everett directed a thrilling peroration to the famous warrior. Everett's biographer describes the effect on the audience:

With the name of the French hero the last word upon his lips the orator took his seat, and a period of absolute silence followed! Not a sound was heard — save of suppressed sobs; not a movement seen, except the wiping of eyes, for nearly every face was bathed in tears. The spell was so supreme that the entire audience seemed hypnotized. But the response came at length, and it was overwhelming. Cheers were given; handkerchiefs were waved, and it seemed as though the clapping of hands would never cease.⁴

It was the turning point of Everett's life. He set aside three hats, clergyman, journalist, professor, and donned two new ones, statesman and orator. By the time he arrived at Gettysburg he had been Congressman, Senator, Governor, Ambassador, and Secretary of State. Launched on the stormy seas of politics by his brilliant Phi Beta Kappa address, oratory continued to be his salvation and his great contribution after political shipwreck. His failure to reach the White House was not due to his failure as an orator. There were four volumes of his addresses in print. His "Washington," given nearly one hundred fifty times, earned \$70,000 toward the purchase of Mount Vernon as a permanent national shrine. His Lexington, Concord, and Plymouth addresses, his tributes to Franklin, Webster, Lafayette, Washington, Adams and Jefferson were committed to memory by American schoolboys then as Lincoln's address is now. He failed to achieve the presidential pinnacle because he was not primarily a fighter and the times called for a fighter. In his anxiety to preserve the Union, he temporized on the issue of slavery, incurring the wrath of both sides. His second speech in Congress, March 9, 1826, lasted three hours. It haunted him for thirty-five years. With the Haitian slave insurrection fresh in his mind he offered to put a musket on his shoulder to suppress any such uprising in America! Fifty-five years later Wendell Phillips delivered the Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard, his famed "The Scholar in a Republic." Speaking on the fifty-seventh anniversary of Everett's Phi Beta Kappa triumph, he referred to "that unrivalled scholar, the first and greatest New England

³ Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

ever sent to Congress, who signalled his advent by quoting the original Greek of the New Testament in support of slavery, and offering to shoulder a musket in its defence."⁵

Everett's own brother-in-law, the eminent Charles Francis Adams, described him as "stuff not good enough to wear in rainy weather, though bright enough in sunshine."⁶ Even at Gettysburg as he neared his peroration his listeners heard him censure his own neutralism:

A sad foreboding of what would ensue, if war should break out between North and South, has haunted me through life, and led me, perhaps too long, to tread in the path of hopeless compromise, in the fond endeavor to conciliate those who were predetermined not to be conciliated.⁷

Actually he was opposed to slavery, but his great dread that the Union might be torn in two dominated his statesmanship and his oratory. His "Washington" delivered from state to state, taking him all through the country, was not given only to save Mount Vernon, but far above this, to save the Union. In every major city in the land he reminded Americans of Jefferson's plea to Washington to accept the second term, "North and South will hang together while they have you to hang to." Then he pleaded with them to "hang to his memory", however divided they might be on other things.⁸

But once the actual shooting started, Everett delivered his most impassioned orations for Northern victory. The only hope for his beloved Union now lay in this victory and he spoke with all his force from the depths of his heart that his nation might become again indivisible. The last four years of his life were the years of the Civil War and the same brother-in-law who had branded him a summer soldier with a timidity like that of a woman then said of him:

The progress of events had brought him to a point where his fears no longer checked him. . . . As a consequence he spoke forth at last with all his power what he really felt. The change was wonderful. From that time I felt myself drawn to him as never before. . . . To me his four last years appear worth more than all the rest of his life, including the whole series of his rhetorical triumphs.⁹

It was as an orator that he won his place in nineteenth century America. And in the fall of 1863 his supremacy in this arena was unquestioned.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶ Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1877-93), III, pp. 369-70.

⁷ Edward Everett, *Address of Hon. Edward Everett at the Consecration of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, 19th November, 1863* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1864), p. 72.

⁸ Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

⁹ Charles Francis Adams, *Richard Henry Dana, A Biography* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1890), II, p. 280.

War correspondent John Russell Young, on the eve of his twenty-third birthday, interviewed Everett the night before the ceremonies. In his personal reminiscences he recalls the sense of awe and veneration which came over him as he entered the room, the apostolic fame of Everett with the younger generation, linked with Webster, Clay, and Calhoun. The great triumvirate gone, he was the last peerless orator. "No more great men left to us, only Everett." In retrospect after the passing of the years, Young acknowledges that Everett's fame had faded, for "in the tapestries of our Pantheon the war colors darken all others with their fiery splendor." The interview revolved around Napoleon, Scott, and Byron, and though the young reporter took the story "as from an oracle of the Olympian gods," Young's lasting memory was the man rather than the conversation:

The antique, courtly ways, fine keen eyes, a voice with a singular charm, old-fashioned tones of pronunciation, perhaps only old-fashioned to our uncouth ears; the soft, white hair, sunny, silken, clinging, and that caressed handkerchief, which helped to turn so many a phrase. It was really not a call, but a tribute — a visit of ceremony, feeling as if we would say, Oh, master, oh my king! — homage and reverence duly paid, and accepted with a soft sovereign dignity. As Everett sat in the low roofed Gettysburg chamber, to my young revering eyes he seemed like some stately comrade of Adams and Jay, stepped out from the sacred past. This memory of him rests with me as I write.¹⁰

It must have been a singular source of satisfaction, after political defeat and failure, to know that when his nation needed a voice for its momentous hour at Gettysburg, all hearts turned to Edward Everett.

The President, then, was not the orator of the day, and was expected by no one to deliver *the* Gettysburg Address. When the ceremonies were over, no one thought he had, least of all the President himself. Indeed his mind went back to his boyhood days on the farm to find a metaphor for failure. When the mucky soil defied the mold board of the plow, his father had remarked, "It won't scour." Lincoln felt that way about his few remarks. "It won't scour," he said. "That speech is a flat failure and the people are disappointed." The people had been disappointed. He stopped before he had fairly begun. The general reaction was one of astonishment. Reporter Young simply could not believe that the few lines of shorthand on his pad constituted a complete speech. Hurriedly bending over the aisle, he asked the President if that was all, and was answered in the affirmative.¹¹

If neither speech had been set down in print, it seems quite certain that Everett, not Lincoln, would be remembered for *the* Gettysburg

¹⁰ John Russell Young, *Men and Memories* (New York: F. Tennyson Neely, [1901]), p. 63.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

Address. But they were set down in print, and almost immediately discerning journalists here and there began to rate Lincoln's "few appropriate remarks" above the elaborate oration of Dr. Everett. Everett himself was the first to correct his original impression of the Lincoln speech with a laudatory sentence the President prized as his highest compliment!¹² Everett's first reaction was negative. Questioned by Seward and Lamon at the close of the exercises, he responded, "It is not what I expected from him. I am disappointed."¹³ Along with everyone else the brevity of the remarks had taken him by surprise. On sober second thought, as his mind turned from the quantity to the quality of the lines, he wrote to the President that same evening his most quoted sentence and Lincoln's favorite compliment, "I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near the central idea of the occasion in two hours as you did in two minutes."¹⁴

Everett, however, did not mean to infer that Lincoln had delivered the Gettysburg Address. The following year in a letter to Charles Francis Adams he regretted being unable to send along a pamphlet copy of "the Gettysburg Address." The context of the letter leaves no doubt that he referred to his own speech. It reveals as well that he was pardonably proud of the "rapt attention" of "an immense throng".¹⁵

Time and critical evaluation, however, have gradually transferred the association from Everett to Lincoln. Today the Gettysburg Address recalls Lincoln alone. Everett and his speech have been forgotten.

It was a lengthy oration, over 13,000 words, spoken in two hours, but length of time was no violation of speech etiquette in those days. Webster's "Reply to Hayne" was just as long. Burke's defense of the American colonies on taxation was longer. Lincoln's Cooper Institute address was extolled by orator Rufus Choate with the tribute, "For an hour and a half he held his audience in the hollow of his hand." Everett had done this hundreds of times in his oratorical career. Judge Story wrote to him after his famous Pilgrim Oration, "One hour and fifty-five minutes is a long time to hold an audience in delighted silence. That triumph belongs to you in connection with very few."¹⁶

To earn such triumphs, always he prepared with painstaking thoroughness. Like Demosthenes, whose speeches were assailed by an opponent as "smelling of the lamp," Everett was scrupulous in details of research and fidelity of composition. He spent three days on the battleground

¹² William E. Barton, *Lincoln at Gettysburg*. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1930), p. 105.

¹³ Ward Hill Lamon, *Recollections of Abraham Lincoln*, (Washington, D.C.: Dorothy Lamon Teillert, 1911), p. 174.

¹⁴ Basler, Roy (editor), *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VII, pp. 24-5.

¹⁵ Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

¹⁶ As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 400.

checking every topographical reference, studying military reports for final authenticity. From first to last it is a finished manuscript. And he delivered it from memory! This seems unbelievable, but then the orator had an unbelievable memory. Replacing the Harvard Phi Beta Kappa orator on short notice on one occasion, Everett was preceded by Longfellow, poet of the day. Imagine the latter's surprise, after reading his poem, to hear Everett, a few minutes later, repeat "with exquisite cadence and expression several of the lines of the unprinted poem . . . which he had memorized as they fell from Longfellow's lips—introduced, too, into the oration as though they belonged there . . ."¹⁷

Although Everett did not often depart from his text, the first paragraph at Gettysburg was a happy exception. It is not in the copy submitted to the press, and was inserted to express his humility in the face of this solemn task. Its first fifty-two words read like free verse and are not surpassed by any of the later passages. It calls to mind the aphorism from the Book of Proverbs, "A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in a basket of silver."

Standing beneath this serene sky, overlooking these broad fields now reposing from the labors of the waning year, the mighty Alleghanies dimly towering before us, the graves of our brethren beneath our feet, it is with hesitation that I raise my poor voice to break the eloquent silence of God and Nature.¹⁸

We seek in vain a commentary which does justice to the ensuing near perfect parallel between the Greek ceremony of consecration at Marathon and the American dedication day at Gettysburg. Both battles rank with the most decisive engagements in history. Both were crucial to the future of freedom and to national survival. Each dealt a blow to slavery. Both battlefields, contrary to custom, were turned into cemeteries. At Marathon, as at Gettysburg, a pre-consecration procession marched to the field, assembled before a temporary platform, listened to the chosen citizen speaker, consigned the heroes to separate interment by Greek Tribes and American States respectively, and made special provision for the unknown soldiers.

Probably no other living American could have drawn this beautiful analogy. With his appointment to a full professorship in Greek at Harvard, the "youthful pilgrim" visited the battlefield and burial ground of Marathon. How natural, with this historic speech assignment, that his memory should recall the day when he "gazed with respectful emotion on the mound which still protects the dust of those who rolled back the tide of Persian invasion."¹⁹ It was a well deserved and appropriately

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

¹⁸ Everett, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2.

considered tribute to the recent American dead, this commingling with the heroes of Marathon, whose bright page in history is undimmed after twenty-four centuries.

His fifty minute account of the three-day struggle must appear long-winded to the American nine decades later who endorses the brief funeral service, the short service club speech, and limits his preacher with the admonition, "Nobody is saved after the first twenty minutes." But Everett spoke to folk who came to hear a long address. As Lincoln wrote to him next day, "In our respective parts yesterday you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one."²⁰ The President was right about Everett's part. The people expected and got a long speech. He was wrong about his own part. They did not expect and were disappointed to receive from him a speech so very brief. It was a day when audiences anticipated an hour and a half or two hour oration as an afternoon or evening of entertainment. They would have considered themselves ill-used indeed had the orator spoken within the bounds of the modern twenty or thirty minute limit. Lincoln's brevity, which so surprised his audience, was not, of course, the fault of the President. The arrangements committee had urged brevity upon him, even to the degree of specifying "a few appropriate remarks."²¹

We moderns might consider the intricate detail extraneous. Everett's audience did not. Nor did their speaker. He expressed regret that he could not have been *more* meticulous, as in the accounts at Lexington, Concord, and Bloody Brook. In these orations he memorialized the humblest privates by recounting the personal exploits of each man named. Families had traveled many miles to hear the "golden mouthed orator" particularize the part their own soldier had played. Suppose the man in your family had fallen with General Reynolds in the opening round of battle, holding the enemy at bay while reinforcements were rushed up, or during General Crawford's counterattack, spearheading the afternoon success of the second day, or in General Steinwehr's command on Cemetery Hill, hurling back the furious onslaught of the famed Louisiana Tigers. Suppose the Fates had assigned him to the Second Corps or Doubleday's division or Stannard's brigade, absorbing the herculean effort of Hill and Longstreet on the final day, climaxed by Pickett's immortal charge, contesting the heights in that awful twenty minutes when the battle and perhaps the war hung in the balance, and finally beating them back to change the course of history. Would the minute details of the orator's narrative seem too long? Or would you hang on his every word as he recounted the thrilling particulars of the momentous conflict your soldier had given his life to win?

²⁰ Basler, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 24.

²¹ F. Lauriston Bullard, "A Few Appropriate Remarks" (Harrogate, Tennessee: Lincoln Memorial University, 1944), p. 11.

This storied detail is still able to carry the modern reader along in its moving current. Think, then, of the listener of 1863 who had lost a loved one on the very ground on which he stood. And he was not carried along by words on a printed page, subject to his own emphasis and interpretation. He was listening to "strains of delicious music" from the orator who held first place in the hearts of his countrymen, and who was delivering, in Sandburg's phrase, "the effort of his life."²²

This was the section of the Everett Gettysburg Address singled out by Judge Wills, originator of the idea for the cemetery and the ceremony, as worthy of descent to posterity "as a product of permanent historical value."²³ President Lincoln had selected for special commendation the tribute to the nurses and the section arguing that the General Government was not a mere agency whose principals are the States, "one of the best arguments for the national supremacy."²⁴ Everett himself, however, selected as "by far the most original and most valuable portion of the address" the final major section, "the historical parallels by which I endeavored to show that the feuds generated by civil wars are as transient as they are bitter while they last."²⁵ He drew compelling parallels between the lethal conflicts in England, Germany, France, and Italy to prove his point and proved it well. It was natural that this "Union-Saver" should feel a special affection for the words that predicted the restoration of the united States. Forney said that when he "prophesied a time to come when the old wounds would be forgotten and the Union restored, he looked like a Prophet of old, and every heart palpitated Amen!"²⁶ Not so the public press. Hatreds ran deep and Everett was criticized for this portion of the speech. Among the hundreds of letters commending the address only two alluded to this favorite portion of the speaker of the day.²⁷ With the great gift of passionless hindsight, however, it may be said with justice that the orator was probably right, that this was the best portion of the address.

And now, without the slightest sign of tiring after two hours of magnetic speaking and eloquent gesturing, the senior rhetor comes to his peroration. Young was concerned with the physical effort demanded by a two hour declamation from a speaker nearing seventy, bareheaded in the open air. But there was no sign of weakness, faltering, hesitation. Said Young:

The brave old statesman seemed imbued with the genius of oratory. No Demosthenes, no Cicero, no Patrick Henry pleading for his country's fate,

²² Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln*, Sangamon Edition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), IV, p. 468.

²³ Everett, *op. cit.*, p. (5).

²⁴ Basler, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 24.

²⁵ Frothingham, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

could have been more thoroughly impressed with the solemnity of the hour. . . . He was graceful with his hands. They were never in his way, as is so often the case with undeveloped orators. An effective way of impressively raising them, and gently bringing them together as they came down — this I recall — this and the handkerchief — which at times he would drop from one hand into the other as I used to see Disraeli do in the House of Commons. . . . There were none of the 'effects' of public speaking, but you might as well have expected an effect from a symphony of Beethoven, or a statue of Michelangelo.²⁸

The peroration, delivered with appropriate pauses, practiced graceful gestures, dramatic raising and lowering of the voice, all the studied perfections of his beloved nineteenth century school of classical oratory, reads:

. . . Seminary Ridge, the Peach-Orchard, Cemetery, Culp, and Wolf Hill, Round Top, Little Round Top, humble names, henceforward dear and famous, — no lapse of time, no distance of space, shall cause you to be forgotten. "The whole earth," said Pericles, as he stood over the remains of his fellow-citizens, who had fallen in the first year of the Peloponnesian War, "the whole earth is the sepulchre of illustrious men." All time, he might have added, is the millennium of their glory. Surely I would do no injustice to the other noble achievements of the war, which have reflected such honor on both arms of the service, and have entitled the armies and the navy of the United States, their officers and men, to the warmest thanks and the richest rewards which a grateful people can pay. But they, I am sure, will join us in saying, as we bid farewell to the dust of these martyr-heroes, that wheresoever throughout the civilized world the accounts of the great warfare are read, and down to the latest period of recorded time, in the glorious annals of our common country there will be no brighter page than that which relates THE BATTLES OF GETTYSBURG.²⁹

Bullard says of this address, "Not more than one in a hundred who speak lightly of it has ever read it." He pleads for justice to Edward Everett, who that day "did what was expected of him and did it well."³⁰

Many who have spoken lightly of it may have done so in the mistaken impulse that they were thus exalting Lincoln's dedicatory remarks. The greatness of this tiny masterpiece needs no apologist to deprecate the Ciceronian rhetoric of the speaker of the day. We do the President a better turn if we acknowledge freely, as he himself did, the excellences of the Everett oration. And when we have done so, and given the great rhetorician his tardy deserts, Lincoln's gem of literature will still tower above it in the majesty of its very simplicity as "The purest gold of human eloquence, nay, of eloquence almost divine."³¹

For on that day at Gettysburg two styles of oratory met, one in its de-

²⁸ Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-8.

²⁹ Everett, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-2.

³⁰ Bullard, *op. cit.*, p. 23, p. 25.

³¹ Lord Curzon, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. iii.

clining glory, represented by the peerless master of the school of literary demonstrative oratory, the other in its rising ascendancy, represented by a style of speech and manner severe in its simplicity. Literary demonstrative oratory at its best requires the consummate scholarship of an Everett, whose manuscripts were carefully prepared, then just as carefully refined, then polished to final perfection. It requires as well a rich background and a vivid imagination since it does not depend upon the actual occasion to provide spontaneity, and thus must come to fruition in the quiet of the study. It gives scope to all the elocutionary arts, which are memorized and rehearsed as carefully as the manuscript itself, as when Everett wiped his eyes one hundred fifty times at the same point in his one hundred fifty deliveries of his "Washington." Its danger is that it may become too polished, too artificial, too mechanical. Its weaknesses are best revealed in the disciples of Everett, who failing to achieve his perfections, exposed the flaws in purely literary demonstrative oratory.

Lincoln, it is true, was not the exquisite machine the listener admired in Everett—Everett, whose hand and eye and voice performed in perfect harmony. Lincoln was tall, gaunt, ungainly, awkward, his hands and feet actually getting in his way. His voice was thin, high, shrill, strident, with a noticeable Kentucky accent. But humble, unaffected, and sincere, he represented the natural oratory which eclipsed the literary demonstrative style of Everett. Rufus Choate, who spoke of Everett as the "golden mouthed orator," said of Lincoln:

It was marvelous to see how this untutored man, by mere self-discipline and the chastening of his own spirit, had outgrown all meretricious arts, and found his way to the grandeur and strength of absolute simplicity.³²

Everett himself had a premonition of the waning of his school of classical oratory and the waxing of the realistic oratory of the later nineteenth century. He chided his stateliness as not sufficiently flowing and natural, found himself winning more success on his more spontaneous efforts, leading him to doubt the wisdom of his labored preparations. Colonel Robert Ingersoll, himself one of the world's greatest orators, contrasts the styles and the two Gettysburg speeches:

If you wish to know the difference between an orator and an elocutionist — between what is felt and what is said — between what the heart and brain can do together and what the brain can do alone — read Lincoln's wondrous words at Gettysburg, and then the speech of Edward Everett. The oration of Lincoln will never be forgotten. It will live until languages are dead and lips are dust. The speech of Everett will never be read. The elocutionists believe in the virtue of voice, the sublimity of syntax, the majesty of long sentences, and the genius of gesture. The orator loves the real, the simple, the natural. He places

³² Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), p. 156.

the thought above all. He knows that the greatest ideas should be expressed in the shortest words — that the greatest statues need the least drapery.³³

Even Young, with all his youthful veneration for this "oracle of the Olympian gods," this last of the great men, expresses the poignant disappointment of one who must have awaited the Everett address with an attitude bordering on worship:

I felt as I looked at the orator as if he was some antique Greek statue, so finished, so beautiful, so chaste, so cold, the lines so perfect, the exquisite tracery of the divine manhood — all there — all evolved and rescued from stone — the masterful art, something that you ever dwell upon with freshening wonder at the capacity of human genius. But so cold! If it were only alive! If only some immediate trenchant thought, spoken as if it came from the very throne of God; if only some living thought could go out over these hillsides to the millions beyond — a trumpet call and an incentive, if only the spirit, the fury of the war, the thought in all men's hearts could come from those silver lips, and that voice of harmony and persuasion! But so cold, so chaste, so exquisitely beautiful, that even the mighty fact that we were at Gettysburg — that we were standing upon our Marathon — seemed lost in our wonder at the speaker's genius and skill.³⁴

Lincoln, on the other hand, felt so humble in his dedicatory remarks that he prophesied, "The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." This sincere word of modesty has been reversed by many a critic since to point out that what they did there is better remembered because of what he said. An impressive shrine in marble and bronze near the west entrance to the National Cemetery of Gettysburg may be the *only* Speech Memorial. Philatelists thumb their catalogs in vain to find another speech commemorated by the issue of a U.S. postage stamp. And Indiana carved the address into a three-ton piece of limestone in the form of an open book, eight feet wide, five feet high and a foot thick. When Lord Curzon, eminent English rhetorician, was asked to name the greatest oration in the English language, he awarded third place to his countryman, William Pitt, for his toast after the victory at Trafalgar, second place to Lincoln's Second Inaugural, and first place to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, "a pure well of English undefiled . . . among the glories and treasures of mankind."³⁵

Two styles of oratory met at Gettysburg, then, and the new style triumphed over the old, though no one recognized the triumph that day, least of all the President, who left the field in failure and defeat. But while his spoken word had shocked his auditors with its brevity, the writ-

³³ As quoted in R. M. Wanamaker, *The Voice of Lincoln* (New York: Scribner's, 1918), p. 230.

³⁴ Young, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

³⁵ Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9.

ten word was discovered the next day by the *Springfield Republican*, the *Providence Journal*, and the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*. True, the larger papers praised Everett and ignored Lincoln completely, Greeley's *Tribune*, Bennett's *Herald*, Raymond's *Times*, Weed's *Albany Journal*, and Medill's *Chicago Tribune*. Dr. Josiah Gilbert Holland of Springfield Massachusetts, Everett's home state, wrote in the *Republican* the following day an editorial which would do credit to a modern critic with the hindsight of a hundred years and a day:

Surpassingly fine as Mr. Everett's oration was in the Gettysburg consecration, the rhetorical honors of the occasion were won by President Lincoln. His little speech is a perfect gem; deep in feeling, compact in thought and expression, and tasteful and elegant in every word and comma. . . Turn back and read it over, it will repay study as a model speech. Strong feelings and a large brain were its parents — a little painstaking its *accoucheur*.³⁶

Thus, even an oration "surpassingly fine" was eclipsed by those "few appropriate remarks." But we would add one other tribute before Everett's defense rests in this second hearing before the Muse of History, a word from a staunch admirer of the "natural oratory" of Lincoln, William Mathews. He had heard and enjoyed the orations of Edward Everett, describing him fifteen years after Gettysburg as "the most consummate rhetorician that America has yet produced." In his book on orators the section on Everett closes with these words:

To read his addresses, now that his silvery accents are hushed is a rare pleasure; but to hear them accompanied by the magic spell of his delivery — by the cadences and tones, "the swells and sweeps and subsidences of feeling," the poetry of gesture, attitude, and eye, with which the enchanter sent them home to the mind and heart, — was a felicity which one may no more forget than he can give expression to it in words.³⁷

At the one hundredth anniversary of the Gettysburg consecration, November 19, 1963, the present writer hopes that Charles Laughton will be invited to read Lincoln's Gettysburg Address on that famous battlefield from a new temporary platform. But we hope that before he does, he will be invited to select and read what he considers to be the finest passages from the *Other Gettysburg Address*. If he does, the words of Edward Everett will live again, carried in the national press as they were a hundred years before. But this time they will be broadcast, filmed and telecast. Millions of Everett's countrymen will hear and read them for the first time, and justice, long overdue, will finally be accorded the "Prince of Rhetoricians."

³⁶ Quoted in Sandburg, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 474.

³⁷ William Mathews, *Oratory and Orators* (Chicago: S.C. Griggs and Company, 1879), p. 345.

The Whereabouts of General Beauregard

By Telegraph to Vanity Fair — After Manner of Daily Papers

HAVRE DE GRACE, April 26.—Gen. Beauregard was in Richmond at 23 minutes past 6 o'clock yesterday, and will attack Washington at once.

PHILADELPHIA, April 26.—We learn on undoubted authority, that Gen. Beauregard was in Alexandria at 24 minutes past 6 yesterday, reconnoitring.

BALTIMORE, April 26.—Gen. Beauregard was in Norfolk at 25 minutes past 6 yesterday, and took a gin cocktail with several of the first families.

HAVRE DE GRACE, April 26.—I learn from a gentleman just from Mobile, that Gen. Beauregard is on his way North, with 150,000 troops. Gen. Beauregard is six feet high, but will not join Blower's "Household Guards." Declines advertising the *Household Journal*.

ANNAPOLIS, April 26.—Gen. Beauregard was discovered in the White House rear-yard last night at 26 minutes past 6, armed with three large howitzers and a portable sledstake. He went away after reconnoitring pretty numerously.

PHILADELPHIA, April 26.—I learn on excellent authority that Gen. Beauregard was in Charleston at 22 minutes past 6 yesterday, and had no intention of leaving. He was repairing Fort Sumter.

The people of Bangor, Maine, and of Cape Cod, Mass., report that Gen. Beauregard has lately been seen prowling around those places.

I learn that Gen. Beauregard is within five miles of Washington.

The report in some of your contemporaries, that Gen. Beauregard is within five miles of Washington, is utterly without foundation. Sensation despatches in times like these cannot be too strongly deprecated. The public will invariably find my despatches reliable, and can always find out all about Gen. Beauregard by buying *Vanity Fair*.

For Collectors Only

EDITED BY RALPH G. NEWMAN

18 East Chestnut Street

Chicago 11, Illinois

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

DR. FREEMAN IN HIS CONFEDERATE BOOK SHELF included three titles under the heading, "The Constitutional Issue." The compiler of a Union list also finds that three titles cover his phase of the constitutional problem. In the Confederate list the authors seem to be on the defensive. They are committed to uphold the principle of secession. For the Union it was more a problem of conducting a war under the existing form of government and within the framework of the constitution. While Lincoln's writings constantly refer to the preservation of the Union, he also faced major constitutional problems within his own government. The draft, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, were but a few of the many legal problems confronting the Lincoln administration.

BASLER, ROY P., editor, MARION DOLOROS TRATT and LLOYD A. DUNLAP, associate editors, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*. Abraham Lincoln Association and Rutgers University Press, 1953-5, 9 volumes.

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NOTABLE BIOGRAPHIES — MILITARY & POLITICAL

(Arranged by subject)

Preparing a list of notable Union biographies presents a problem quite different from that posed for the compiler of a Southern list. Where the military personalities dominate the Confederate list, the political figures

headed by the towering figure of Abraham Lincoln take over the Union story. As a result, we find that with the exception of Grant and Sherman, the great biographies of most of the important Northern military personalities are still to be written, and new discoveries will necessitate further studies of Grant and Sherman. It is to be hoped that when his busy schedule is relaxed, Bruce Catton will be able to complete the multi-volume biography of Grant which the late Lloyd Lewis began with *Captain Sam Grant*. It would be certainly worth-while to have Lewis' *Sherman: Fighting Prophet* revised to include material in the recently released Sherman papers. Walter Hebert's biography of General Hooker is a notable exception where the minor Northern military personalities are concerned—it is difficult to single out another first-rate book in the field.

It is the political field that we find strongest in the biography section of the Union Book Shelf. Even when only four Lincoln titles are included, the lives of civil leaders far overshadow those of the military. As in the previous listings, the reader is reminded again that these listings are by no means final or definitive. You are asked in effect to "try these on for size"—some will stay in the shelf, others will be dropped and we hope that new titles herein overlooked will be suggested by the readers of *Civil War History*.

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Our Orders

Weave no more silks, ye Lyons looms,
To deck our girls for gay delights!
The crimson flower of battle blooms,
And solemn marches fill the nights.

Weave but the flag whose bars to-day
Drooped heavy o'er our early dead,
And homely garments, coarse and gray,
For orphans that must earn their bread!

Keep back your tunes, ye viols sweet,
That pour delight from other lands!
Rouse there the dancer's restless feet, —
The trumpet leads our warrior bands.

And ye that wage the war of words,
With mystic fame and subtle power,
Go, chatter to the idle birds,
Or teach the lesson of the hour!

Ye Sibyl Arts, in one stern knot
Be all your offices combined!
Stand close, while Courage draws the lot,
The destiny of humankind!

And if that destiny could fail,
The sun should darken in the sky,
The eternal bloom of Nature pale,
And God, and Truth, and Freedom die!

—*Atlantic Monthly*

Notes & Queries

EDITED BY BOYD B. STUTLER

517 Main Street

Charleston, West Virginia

AN OPEN FORUM FOR READERS of *Civil War History* for questions on phases of the Great Conflict, and for illuminating notes on newly discovered and unrecorded sidelights of the war. Contributions are invited; address Notes and Queries Editor.

NOTE

Stonewall Jackson's Arm:

At a meeting of the Civil War Round Table of New York some one asked what disposition, if known, was made of Stonewall Jackson's arm after amputation. No one had the answer, but now it is supplied by Dr. Roy Bird Cook, Charleston, West Virginia, author of *Family and Early Life of Stonewall Jackson*, (three editions). Lieutenant General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson was wounded by his own men in the evening of May 2, 1863, after leading the 2nd Corps, CSA, around Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, routing the right wing of the Federal army. He was removed to the Corps Field Hospital at Wilderness Tavern, where his wounds were dressed and his left arm amputated and on May 4, at General Lee's insistence, he was moved 27 miles to the Chanler home at Guiney Station, near Fredericksburg, where he died on May 10. The arm was buried in the old Ellwood burying ground, on a farm then owned by Leo T. Jones, near the site of the Corps Field Hospital. A marker was set up at the place of burial several years ago bearing the inscription: "Arm of Stonewall Jackson. May 3, 1863."

QUERIES

4. *Custer's Commission:*

I have read a statement that the commission as Brigadier or Major General issued to George H. Custer was sent him through an administrative error; that the officer intended for promotion was an entirely

different person. I can not remember the source of the statement, and can find no reference to such an error in the works about Custer which I have examined. Query: What is the source of the statement, and can such a charge be substantiated?

Dr. Richard Reece Boone

5. *Lincoln at Cooper Union:*

In her *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 2, p. 327 (Sangamon Edition, vol. 2, p. 157), Ida Tarbell says of Lincoln's preparation for his speech at Cooper Union, New York, on February 27, 1860: "In order that he might be sure that he was heard he arranged with his friend, Mason Brayman, who had come to New York with him, to sit in the back of the hall and in case he did not speak loud enough to raise his high hat on a cane." Query: What was Miss Tarbell's source or authority for this story?

Carl Haverlin

6. *Jeb Stuart's Death:*

In *Lee's Lieutenants*, (vol. 3, pp. 424 *et seq.*), Douglas S. Freeman presents a circumstantial and documented account of the wounding and death of General J. E. B. Stuart. In this account it is said that Stuart's death occurred a good many hours after he was shot; other historians agree that he was killed well-nigh instantly. Query: Approximately what period of time elapsed between the wounding and death of General Stuart?

7. *Texas Cavalry Captain:*

Captain John Jacob Gragard, later of New Orleans, commanded a troop of Texas cavalry during the Civil War, believed to have been a unit of the 1st Texas Cavalry or 1st Texas Lancer Regiment (21st Cavalry). Query: Can any one identify his command, or tell of his capture and imprisonment?

John L. Sehon

8. *Abram Lincoln, U.S. Army:*

Cadet Abram Lincoln was graduated from West Point Military Academy with the class of 1846, a classmate of Stonewall Jackson, but dropped from sight after a few years in the army. Query: What was his subsequent history; did he serve in the Civil War under Commander-in-Chief Abraham Lincoln?

Roy Bird Cook

The Continuing War

EDITED BY E. B. LONG

333 South Edson

Lombard, Illinois

ALL OF THOSE ENTHUSIASTS now taking part in the Civil War will rejoice at the announcement of the newly-formed Civil War Book Club. The club is designed to meet the needs of those who want to read and own the best of Civil War literature, old and new. It is planned that signed first editions will be distributed to members. It seems possible that some of the important, older titles, now out of print, may be reissued. Ralph G. Newman, of the Abraham Lincoln Book Shop, is President of the club; the Advisory Board consists of Allan Nevins, Benjamin P. Thomas, Bruce Catton, Stanley F. Horn, and Bell I. Wiley. The first book from the club is expected in October.

There seems to be no end to the Civil War studies which are in progress. Undoubtedly there are many about which we have not heard. Please let us know about *your* project. Perhaps some of our readers can help you in your research.

One of the bigger events this fall is bound to be the new MacKinlay Kantor novel, *Andersonville*, which is to be published by World. Those who have seen the manuscript say that it will be one of the really important Civil War novels.

Harnett Kane is at work on a new novel, but all he will say is that it is concerned with a Civil War theme.

In the Lincoln field, the new index to the Robert Todd Lincoln collection of Lincoln papers held by the Library of Congress is now ready. Mrs. Ruth P. Randall, author of *Mary Lincoln*, is at work on a volume concerning Abraham Lincoln's sons.

Clifford Dowdey, well-known to all students of the Civil War, is contributing a book on the Confederacy, *The Land They Fought For*, to the Mainstream of America series. Bruce Catton will furnish a book on the North for the same series.

T. Harry Williams, whose excellent, newly published biography of

Beauregard has been so well received, is at work on a short life of General Grant.

Clyde C. Walton, Jr., editor of *Civil War History*, is digging into the problems of Indians and the Civil War.

Gilbert Govan of Chattanooga is at work on a much-needed life of Joe Johnston.

Stefan Lorant is preparing a new picture book of the Civil War.

James D. Horan is writing a life of Matthew Brady, the famous Civil War photographer.

Robert S. Henry is editing a new book on Nathan Bedford Forrest which is scheduled to appear soon.

Allan Nevins has resumed writing his multi-volume history of the Civil War period. The first four volumes, titled *Ordeal of the Union* and *The Emergence of Lincoln*, created such favorable attention that we look forward with anticipation to the completion of the series.

Carl Sandburg is well into the second volume of his autobiography — and the second volume will discuss his experiences in writing *Abraham Lincoln*.

Broadcast Music, Incorporated, is preparing a volume to be titled *Songs of the North*, as a companion to *Songs of the Confederacy*.

One of the most interesting projects we have heard of is that of William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf. They are at work writing *Blue and Gray on the Nile*, the story of Civil War soldiers who joined Egyptian Armies.

Appleton-Century-Crofts will soon publish a new, one-volume edition of *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, to be edited by Larned G. Bradford.

General Herman Haupt, the Northern transportation genius, is the subject of a biography being written by H. H. Chapman of Yale University.

Producer George Brandt and writer Norman Corwin are planning a play based on the high points of the Lincoln-Douglas debates; it is to be titled *Tonight: Lincoln versus Douglas*.

Clifford Odets is writing two plays about Lincoln; it is planned that they will be shown on alternate evenings.

And Lincoln once again: Louis de Rochemont Associates have purchased an original screen drama about the Civil War and Lincoln, titled *1864*.

Book Reviews

EDITED BY CHARLES T. MILLER

B-11 University Hall

Iowa City, Iowa

Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief. By Joseph T. Durkin, S.J.
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1954. Pp. xi, 446.
\$6.00.)

THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR abounds in evocative place-names. Manassas, Bull Run, Lookout Mountain, more and most of all, Gettysburg—these places and many others are for most Americans forever overlaid with emotion, legend, and history books. And when one turns to the names of military leaders, Lee, Grant, Jackson—the list is as endless as it is meaningful.

But the reader will note that all these names mentioned above, as well as most of those left out, are connected with land actions. Most of us have at least a passable understanding of the sweep and significance of the fighting among the armies; but our knowledge of the naval side of this great conflict is often very limited. Beyond hazy recollections of the Monitor and the Merrimac (the Virginia, and properly so, to Southerners), and something or other about the Alabama incident, plus perhaps the one enduring naval quotable phrase of the era ("Damn the torpedoes . . .") most of us do not go. To be sure, Van Wyck Mason has begun a series of historical novels about the war on the water; but this is history by the back stairs, if not the bedroom.

Yet that war had a naval side of vast importance. Not only did the Federal blockade throttle the South inexorably, but also numerous naval engagements played a notable part in the outcome of the purely military side of things. Of course, there has been a fair amount of writing about the role of sea-power in the conflict, but certain leading personalities have been unaccountably neglected. This is hard to explain, when one considers the outpouring of writing about the war; it is harder to explain when one realizes that this war saw the first development and use of weapons and tactics all too pertinent to the year 1955.

In all this the subject of Father Durkin's book had a vital hand, for Stephen R. Mallory was Chief of the Confederate Navy throughout almost the entire war. Neglect of a study of him as a person seems incredible; so considerable a scholar as the late Douglas Southall Freeman called him next to Benjamin the

ablest man in Jefferson Davis' cabinet. We are all indebted to Father Durkin for according Mallory the biography his contribution to history deserves.

This book is not the product of the winnowings of masses of primary sources, for most of them, notably Mallory's own notes (he kept a diary and wrote as many letters as most men in his position) were destroyed after Appomattox. Father Durkin, however, has had access to some new sources and has reconstructed a very living and documented picture of the man and his works.

Mallory, born in either 1810 or 1811, lived the first couple of decades of his life in Key West, that half-Spanish, half-American Lands End of a place. Not unnaturally, his early interests were in the direction of the water, and at age twenty he took the job of Inspector of Customs at Key West. His spare time he spent in study, culminating at last in learning law. Here again his bent toward matters maritime asserted itself, for his practice seems to have been largely admiralty law. Lawyers often drift into politics, and so did Mallory. One senses that it was almost by accident that he was chosen by the Florida Democrats as their candidate for the United States Senate, a man neither "radical" nor yet "safe" on the burning issue of the day—slavery. Thus it was that at age forty Stephen Mallory left Florida and entered the national scene.

What sort of person was he? From the nature of his clients and success of his law practice he must have been an able lawyer, capable of winning a jury on one hand and of diplomatic negotiation on the other. Even allowing for "normal" mid-nineteenth century pomposity, he strikes me as pompous. His wit and his courtship of his wife, Angela, were elephantine but effective. He had a gift for getting others to do things, he was even-tempered, he seems to have borne no lasting grudges. Many of his characteristics were those of any successful public figure; he had reason to look forward to a successful career in Washington.

And he bore that promise out. His seaward destiny placed him on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and he became chairman of that body in 1853. At that time one pressing problem facing the conduct of naval affairs was that of retirement of high-ranking officers. There were far too many superannuated officers on active duty, and something had to be done to clear the way for able younger men. This was not an easy thing to do; many senior officers had their advocates in Congress; some of them, furthermore, were famous men, like Matthew Fontaine Maury, the oceanographer and hydrographer. Such men are not easy to retire, as Mallory found. But the job was finally done, the Naval Reform Act and Naval Retiring Board became law, and the United States Navy has ever after had some sort of an orderly plan for promotion and retirement. Also, significantly, but unsuccessfully, Mallory voted for development of the Stevens ironclad.

Life in high-level Washington was easier then than now. Social life was more relaxed, private, and personal. Father Durkin gives us a peek at one party where President Pierce recited Hamlet's soliloquy (shades of *The Missouri Waltz*!), Jefferson Davis gave out with "Is this a dagger that I see before me", and General Scott sang "The bauld soldier boy" and flourished "his sword just as he did in Mexico." It is hard to imagine Admiral King flourishing his typewriter just as he did in the Navy Department. In all this Mallory moved easily. His wife, however, was no great asset. She was moody, complaining,

petty, and jealous, the latter with no reason whatever so far as Father Durkin has been able to find. Indeed, when one recalls that Mallory courted her strenuously, even literarily, for over four years, one wonders whether the game was worth the candle. Certainly, tender mother or no, she was no helpmeet to him in the trying years to come.

So affairs moved on to the denouement of Secession. Mallory and many other Southerners continued to lead in the build-up of the navy that was to strangle them; the War approached. As befitted an elected representative from Florida, Mallory was a staunch advocate of the Southern cause, but not a "Warhawk." No word of disloyalty to the Union was spoken by him, either publicly or, so far as we know, privately. This was to dog him politically during the war years, but it remains to his credit. Conciliation, however, failed, and in February 1861, reluctantly, sadly, Mallory in rounded phrases bade his adieu to the Senate and along with the other Southern Senators walked out of the Senate Chamber, never to return. A new career had to begin.

That career was not long aborning. By the end of February President Davis picked Mallory as Chief of the Confederate Navy Department. He seemed a good choice, though not a unanimous one. He had had a life-long acquaintance with the sea, from the land-going side at least, he had served as a progressive member of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, he was up on the latest developments in ship design and naval ordnance. On the other hand, he had had no direct experience with strategy and with building and maintaining a large organization. This post was, then, one vastly more difficult and taxing than any he had yet filled. At the outset he faced enormous and, indeed, fatal problems raised by the common Southern deficiencies in financial and industrial resources. He had vexing personnel difficulties, too, for a high proportion of Confederate Navy officers were those same superannuated senior officers he had had to deal with in the Senate; his navy was top-heavy. Nothing daunted, he set to with a will, and his record of achievement is impressive.

The material problem was never really solved. By persistence and sacrifice the Confederacy was able to get metal to plate its vessels; but there was not in all the South a means of building a marine engine. There were no adequate shipyards, few mechanics. Timber stood, all unharvested in Southern forests, iron was in the earth, but it took time and capital to get at such natural resources. There was not even one ropewalk to turn out lines from hemp which had first to be planted and reaped. There were insufficient funds to pay what workmen could be found; two ironclads which might have turned the tide at New Orleans were held up because of this lack, and had to be destroyed, at untold military cost. It was clear that the Confederate Navy must come from foreign purchase and the cannibalization of existing vessels. Mallory set about doing just that with surprising success, as we shall see.

The manpower problem was almost equally harassing. There were many more senior officers than there were ships, many of these officers being as well much beyond their prime. It took Mallory over two years of conciliation and cajolery to solve this dilemma. He finally cut the Gordian knot by creating a clever fiction of the sort lawyers understand; he established two officer lists, with the mossbacks in the "Regular Navy" and the younger officers on the lists

of the "Provisional Confederate Navy," thus achieving his ends, but at no inconsiderable cost in command conflicts and hurt feelings. He went further and established a Confederate Naval Academy, one candidate for which was his son, Buddy. It speaks well for Mallory that he was able to accomplish this sensitive and vexatious task while continuing to carry out all his other multifarious duties with ability. His life was made no easier by the complaining letters he got all too often, and generally at times of crisis, from Angela, his helpmeet.

In matters of high strategy Mallory made a mistake common to others in the Confederacy, and, indeed, to other nations similarly hampered by small navies and inadequate shipping. Obviously, Southern blockade runners must be kept in action unhampered. It was thought that armed raiders could be used to harass Federal shipping so as to draw off the Federal Navy and let the blockade runners continue freely. But, as the Germans found in the First World War (and, perhaps in the second World War, though here we have as yet not fully investigated the matter), the larger power with much more shipping was content to suffer losses, to recognize the strategy of division the South was using, and to go after the main goal, the blockade of all Southern shipping. In this the North was successful, and the South paid the direst price for her maritime weakness.

All this sounds as though Mallory's career was untouched by real success. Nothing could be more untrue. Though the South, to be sure, lost the naval war, she made certain achievements and innovations which had the effect of revolutionizing later sea warfare and which, with luck, might perhaps have drawn out the conflict so as to bring the North to call off the struggle. It ought to be easy for us, and instructive, too, living as we do in the year in which the USS Nautilus went to sea, with all that means for the future of sea warfare, to appreciate the radical advancements made largely in the South in naval science and technology.

For it was the South, the "backward" naval power, which was able, as backward naval powers have done before and will do again, to see the potentialities in innovation and change. By placing in action and giving free rein to the Virginia (formerly USS Merrimac) the South showed beyond doubt (and beyond belief, too, so far as certain Southern quarters, and most Northern circles were concerned) that the day of the wooden ship had gone. One day's action around Newport News ended forever the era of the wooden ship of war. Flying in the face of all doctrine, and, let it be said under freedom and encouragement from Mallory, the clumsy, unseaworthy, undergunned ironclad sank the largest ships of the Federal Navy and—heresy indeed!—stood up under the fire of "invincible" Federal shore batteries. (Sad to tell, she was ignominiously scuttled a short time later, when Norfolk fell, but she had made her mark.) This day's work changed sea warfare forever. Wooden ships were, of course, used where they had to be, which was almost everywhere for a time, but both sides and all the world's navies henceforth concentrated on construction of steel hulls. The Virginia's raid, thought of at the time as we now think of the Navy-Doolittle raid, altered the course of history.

But that was far from all. Have-not nations must make do with what they

have; this makes them ingenious. When Farragut at Mobile Bay mentioned the torpedoes unfavorably, he referred not to the modern torpedo driven by steam or electricity but to what we now call mines. These had never before bulked large in warfare; hence much that was done with them by the Confederate Navy was novel. They were used in three general ways. Some were used as moored mines detonated by electricity from shore. Some were used as floating mines. And some were used as "spar torpedoes," which means that they were fastened to a spar which was then driven into the side (or bottom, in the case of submarine use) of the enemy's vessels. Torpedoes were also used as land mines. Students of moral progress will be interested to learn that both sides abhorred this; as Secretary of War Randolph put it (and General Sherman agreed), it was "not admissible to plant shells merely to destroy life and without any other design than that of depriving your enemy of a few men, without materially injuring him." A descendant of General Longstreet is said to have been in the crew which dropped The Bomb at Nagasaki. Ingenuity (I was about to say, Yankee ingenuity) being what it is, some enthusiast had cooked up also a torpedo made to look like a lump of coal; the idea was that the Yankees would shovel them into their burners, with gratifying results, but, alas for ingenuity, they weren't much help in practice. Whatever the case, both sides agreed that the more conventional types were very effective, properly used. They had the advantage of being relatively easy to make from comparatively common materials, so that factories could be set up where needed. After a long period of experiment and failure, a fairly good method of manufacture was devised, and the torpedo took its place in the arsenal of the South. The defense of Charleston was made possible through use of the torpedo more than anything else. The Confederates claimed that the whole James River squadron was kept from helping Grant in the siege of Richmond by fear of torpedoes. Certain it is that the Federals were wary of any harbor until sure its defenses did not include this new weapon. But of course, novel though it was, startling though its action might be, the mine was only useful as a purely defensive measure according to current doctrine, and this limitation meant that the South could use it only in a negative, deterrent way to interdict river mouths and harbors controlled by the rebels.

However, current doctrine, already reeling under this unprecedented use of a new weapon, found itself driven back on another front, for a small group of engineers and brave men were writing the prologue to a chapter of naval history of which none of us today can see the end. True submarine warfare began in the Confederate Navy in 1862 when Captain Hunley and a little bank of officers and mechanics built the Hunley, to be followed by the David. This last vessel struck the first real blow by any submarine in any navy. She was a tiny thing by modern standards, about fifty feet long, six feet wide, and capable of submergence to about twenty feet. She was driven submerged by hand cranks at a top speed of perhaps ten knots. Her armament was a torpedo attached to a spar projecting from her bow. All hands were concerned whether the explosion of this torpedo might not sink the submarine as well as its target; this concern was tragically justified. Three crews met death on the Hunley before she was able to strike a warlike blow; then on 17 February

1864 she sank the great Federal frigate *Housatonic*, being herself carried to the bottom with the wreck, with the loss of all hands. The *David*, however, had struck an earlier blow. On 5 October 1863 she torpedoed the USS *New Ironsides*, damaging her seriously; luckily, the *David*, though at first feared lost, was saved by her crew and returned to port, having opened new horizons in naval warfare. The Federal Navy was perplexed and frightened by the exploits of these brave men; but the fact was that the Confederates were unable because of the tide of events and the many difficulties met in this utterly novel form of war to capitalize on what they had begun. All honor to them for an heroic beginning.

These were heroic deeds, and Mallory was at the heart of them. One need only use a little imagination (or recall experiences ashore in the second World war) to feel how refreshing it must have been to deal only with stubborn machines, tides, and the like, after days spent in all the thousands of harassing problems of supply, personnel, and most of all, politics, which so engrossed the Secretary of the Confederate Navy. For Mallory had his troubles, and as the plight of the South grew worse, as disaster followed disaster, they came not as spies but as battalions. (Reading of them and comparing them to our experience in the two World Wars, with all we know of the personality conflicts, jealousies between individuals and whole services—as in the squabble over who almost lost Saipan and who captured Okinawa—one realizes that truly, "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*") Jefferson Davis he admired, but found hard to deal with and a poor administrator. The Southern newspapers, in an age of journalism by vituperation, were constant crosses, the more so because some of them never forgot that Mallory had not been a "Warhawk." Mallory, however, found it encouraging to recall that his counterpart in Washington was getting the same treatment. However, as if the fall of Norfolk were not enough (and with it the loss of his beloved Virginia), though despite his critics it is hard to put the blame for Norfolk on Mallory, it was followed by the loss of New Orleans, presaging the closing of the Mississippi and the loss of the whole war in the West. New Orleans fell for a variety of reasons, among them the fact that no one could be sure whether the Navy or the Army was ultimately in command (this sort of snafu plagued the Confederacy all through the war). Also, had the two ironclads then under construction in the New Orleans area been completed, it is arguable that the South might have prevented Farragut's dash up the river. (Incidentally, he was able to force the surrender of that city by the *threat* of firing on it: in the absence of the banzai spirit total war may be uncalled for.) Ironclads or no ironclads, army or no army, the city fell, and something had to be done. What was done in Mallory's case was to hold a Naval Investigating Committee to fix the blame for these reverses. In peace-time Congressional Committees are rarely objective; in war-time, never. So Mallory had his advocates on the Committee, and his enemies had theirs, and after both sides had had their day in court and two years had passed a report was published, vindicating, nay praising Mallory; it was largely written by his friends.

Meanwhile the war went on. A few triumphs, such as the Arkansas' great dash down the Mississippi to escape, and the feats of the submarines, were

more than cancelled by the steady tide of defeat which began to flow against the South. As the darkness fell, and the currency with it, problems of supply and procurement, of manufacture and shipping became more insoluble. Through it all Mallory labored incessantly; toward the end he labored hopelessly. Atlanta fell, Charleston, Wilmington; and then the final blow, Richmond. The war was over. A wild suggestion of guerilla warfare—fifteen thousand men to be raised, armed, and moved into position in the West in sixty days!—and Mallory resigned, taking leave of Jefferson Davis in order to look after his family, then in the neighborhood of Atlanta. There, in the little town of LaGrange, he was captured and carried off to a Northern prison to expiate his crimes, after the fashion of those who lose wars.

Of the rest of his life there is little to tell. As a principal leader of the Confederacy he had little to hope for at the hands of the Radical Republicans, and he languished for a long time a prisoner at Fort Lafayette. His health, which had shown signs of weakening for the past couple of years, now became worse, but in spite of this he wrote long, heart-rending letters to his family and to President Johnson. But the latter had his hands full with the members of his own victorious party, there was little time for worry about a cabinet member of the fallen South, and it was many months and only after hope had almost gone that he was released on parole. I have spoken somewhat slightly of Angela, his wife; but in this crisis she rose to the occasion and personally interceded for her husband with the president; so did others, but Mallory was deeply touched by this show of affection and greatly buoyed up by it in his darkest hours. It is a tribute to her that when he needed her most she did not fail him.

Out of prison he was indeed, but only to emerge into personal problems of the gravest sort. He had a family to support, and after interviews in Washington he proceeded on what was at times almost a triumphal tour to his old home at Pensacola. Here he set about repairing first his house, damaged during the war, and then his fortunes. Neither was easy or quick, but perseverance and the sale of what little he had left in the way of assets at last made it possible for Angela to return and for him to set up a new law practice. Reconstruction had begun in his personal affairs.

But as he slowly worked his way back to some sort of financial standing, he also ran head-on into the political questions which plagued the South. His reaction can best be summed up by saying that he showed that he was humane and a good loser. Abhorring the Radicals and their works, he nevertheless recognized that the old life was gone, and slavery, at no small cost to himself, with it; and he did all he could on the one hand to accommodate his community to the changes and on the other to oppose the Radical Republicans and their excesses. He tried to express in public speeches and writings his desire that the Negro be assimilated into the new South. He advised, as one might expect, restraint on all sides. But the despotism of the Radicals pushed him at last into open opposition, and the last years of his life were spent in a political struggle against them, by means of speeches and writings in the newspapers. What with renewed political activities and the rebuilding of his law practice, Mallory's last years were busy ones. His family was growing up, and their

progress was a constant source of interest and, at times, concern to him. All in all, he was occupied to the height of his powers.

But those powers were dwindling, and in the spring of 1871 he fell ill and died, with all but one of his family about him.

Father Durkin never quite sums up the man and what he did, preferring perhaps to leave judgment to the reader. This is as well. Unfortunately, such is the nature of the task Father Durkin has set himself, the book, though engrossing and well-written, seems to lack a certain focus. I suspect that it is impossible to cover in 400-odd pages both a great civil war and the life of one man without some confusion and lack of clarity; it may be that the author has written a book that is either too long or too short. While we are able to see that Mallory was steadfast, honorable, moderate, and humane; while we cannot fail to appreciate the wisdom of many of his actions and the courses he undertook as Chief of the Confederate Navy; while we today continue to reap the whirlwind of technology which he sowed as the little breezes of mines and submarines; while we suffer with him in his frustrations and the goads of his opponents; while all this and more is true, still the final portrait lacks sharpness and definition, compared, say, with Thomas' recent life of Lincoln or Freeman's Lee. Yet this is fast company indeed, and because one's first major historical writing suffers in comparison with undoubted masterpieces is no reason for discouragement. Certainly every student of the Civil War, every person interested in the long sweep of naval history must remain forever indebted to Father Durkin for the only real portrait of one of the leading figures in the second American Revolution.

SAMUEL M. FAHR

Iowa City, Iowa.

Rebel Private Front and Rear. By William Andrew Fletcher. Edited by Bell Irvin Wiley. (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 1954. Pp. xvii, 162. \$3.75.)

✓ *Co. Aytch: A Side Show of the Big Show.* By Sam R. Watkins. Edited by Bell Irvin Wiley. (Jackson, Tennessee: McCowat-Mercer Press. 1954. Pp. 231. \$5.00.)

✓ *A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife.* By Spencer Glasgow Welch. (Marietta, Georgia: Continental Book Company. 1954. Pp. 127. \$5.00.)

✓ *Confederate Letters of John W. Hagan.* Edited by Bell Irvin Wiley. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press. 1954. Pp. 55. \$1.50.)

Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868. Edited by John Q. Anderson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1955. Pp. xxii, 400. \$4.95.)

AT AN INFORMAL MEETING of the New York Round Table some time ago Fletcher Pratt and John Bakeless talked of the problems of locating the source material so necessary in any writing of an historical nature. Colonel Bakeless recalled many instances where old family records were thrown out during a

vigorous spring cleaning or left in attics or closets and allowed to serve as the lining for rat nests. He pleaded that people who owned homes with attics go through old trunks and deliberate well before discarding any old letters, diaries, journals or records. Happily the picture is not always quite as bleak as that, since many families have not only taken great care of such papers but have permitted students to go over them and use much of their contents in articles and books.

In recent years preserving and editing such family papers has been a rewarding work of historical scholarship. One of the most tireless workers in that field has been Bell Irvin Wiley of Emory University. Not only has he made a major contribution with his *Billy Yank* and *Johnny Reb*, but he has encouraged, edited, and introduced a long list of related material as well as helped in the reissuing of old, long out-of-print classics such as *Rebel Private Front and Rear* by William Andrew Fletcher and *Co. Aytch: A Side Show of the Big Show* by Sam R. Watkins. Students of the period owe Mr. Wiley a great deal for easing their own labors and for giving them a more rounded picture of one of the most dramatic periods in American history.

Although the Civil War has been characterized as "the last of the romantic wars," there was very little of the sentimental in the view taken by Private Fletcher of the Texas Brigade. After each battle this rebel looked with evident satisfaction on the great mounds of Union dead. He felt that war was simply a matter of exterminating the greatest number of the enemy at the least possible cost to his side. With that in mind he rarely permitted sentiment or pity to influence him in the ready use of his rifle. Though his corner of the war was limited to what he could survey over his gunsight it was the vigorous, lusty and—in the main—miserable lot of the enlisted man of any war. Like the true soldier Fletcher fought hard and well during the war but was quick to take the advice he once heard an infantryman pass along while in North Carolina. "Grease and slide back into the Union," was the advice and Veteran Fletcher took it.

In *Co. Aytch Private* Sam Watkins of the First Tennessee Regiment continued the story of the men in the ranks. The First Tennessee was sent into Virginia in July of 1861 but was too late to participate in the battle of Bull Run. Although the men thought the war was over and expected to be sent home they were assigned to Stonewall Jackson's division. After some of his rugged marches they nicknamed that famous Confederate General, "Fool Tom Jackson." The humor of the enlisted man enlivens this readable account of long marches, the mud, the misery, and the hunger of endless campaigns.

Another fascinating account of men in the field is *A Confederate Surgeon's Letters To His Wife*. This small collection of letters reflects the viewpoint of a man whose education and background had been a bit more extensive than that of many of the other journal keepers and letter writers whose impressions have been preserved. However, when Spencer Glasgow Welch looked at men and battles his reaction was not unlike that of the lowliest private. He saw Stonewall Jackson one morning and wrote to his wife that night, "He is a very ordinary looking man." The humor of camp life did not escape this young surgeon's attention. He tells of seeing "an Irishman from South Carolina bring-

ing a wounded Irishman from Pennsylvania back and at the same time scolding him for fighting us."

The letters not only reveal the soldier's lot but the temper of the times and the economic changes the war imposed on those at home. Sending his wife some money, Welch urged her to buy everything she needed "even if calico does cost three dollars a yard and thread one dollar a spool."

Up to the defense of the Bloody Angle, Welch was all confidence and wrote with a measure of contempt about all Union military activities. After that fierce struggle he reflected at some length in a revealing letter to his wife. "The Yankees charged with the greatest determination and it strained us to the utmost to hold our own," he said. "It was perfectly fearful. I never experienced such anxiety in my life. It was the most desperate struggle of the war. I have not heard, but I hope the Yankees are gone and that I shall never again witness such a terrible day as yesterday was."

Still another collection of letters, the *Confederate Letters of John W. Hagan*, contributes a soldier's interesting view of the long bitter war years. John Hagan enlisted with the Twenty-ninth Georgia Volunteer Infantry early in the war but spent almost two years in the relatively quiet areas around Savannah. During the siege of Vicksburg his regiment was rushed to Mississippi by rail in an eleventh hour attempt to aid Pemberton's weary troops. They were too late for that but did get the first taste of battle around Jackson. Later, as a First Sergeant, Hagan saw more action in the Georgia campaign. He was captured at Atlanta and spent seven months as a prisoner of war.

While attending to his military duties, Hagan wrote letters of advice to his wife, Amanda. These ranged from whether or not to sell a parcel of land, what she should sell his bacon for and the shrewd counsel, "I would not Sell the corn if I could move it for it will raiz you a nother bunch of hogs for a nother year. . . ."

A sober and conscientious man, John Hagan was severely critical of his comrades in arms. "Amanda," he wrote, "I never new how mean and army could do in a country I beleave our troops are doing as much harm in this country [Mississippi] as the yankees would do with the exception of burning houses. but our men steal all the fruit Kill all the Hogs & burn all the fence & eat all the mutton corn they can camp in reach of. our army have destroyed as much as 200 acres of corn in one night."

Of the personal reminiscences and journals brought to book one of the outstanding portraits of the Confederate home front is *Brokenburn: the Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868*, edited by John Q. Anderson. With but a few short lapses Kate Stone's journal spans the entire Civil War period. It is a revealing portrait of Louisiana plantation life with some brutally frank observations on the inhabitants of the Texas of 1863, where Kate, her mother and other members of her family were forced to reside while Grant's army maneuvered about Vicksburg.

Although well written, Kate Stone's reflections are not noted for logic. Few books, nevertheless, do a better job of revealing the inherent weakness of the rigid caste system of the plantation economy. Miss Stone regarded the overseers in a contemptuous manner. She expressed regret that a young man she

knew was the son of an overseer and so doomed to ever remain in that class. "So few overseers have gone" to the war, she complained bitterly.

To many in the South the struggle was a gentleman's war and a poor man's fight. Sons of plantation owners rode off to the field of glory with personal body slaves in attendance while their womenfolk waved handkerchiefs and cheered their gray-clad knights. The folks at home then helped the war effort with such pitiful tasks as making uniforms out of old garments and hats from palmetto or straw. With evident pride Kate recorded that "the Southerners are a noble race . . . in proportion as we have been a race of haughty, indolent, and waited-on people, so now we are ready to do away with all forms and work and wait on ourselves." With that for the record Kate then went on to express true feelings on the return of two Negro women when she wrote, "Annie and Peggy got here from the salt works today and we are glad to have somebody to wait on us again. I expect we will keep them busy."

When Grant moved in on Vicksburg the Stone family moved to Texas. Writing back to friends Kate summed up her impressions of the women of Texas in the line, "There must be something in the air of Texas fatal to beauty."

Now completely cut off from practically all news, Kate began to record the rumors which seemed rampant throughout the South. She half hoped they were true. Attacks on Washington, Generals McClellan and Rosecrans severely wounded, victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas, and many more were prayed over.

Although all of these journals and letters treat the Confederate story, it is in such material—from both the North and South—that the student of the period finds the best accounts of what the greatest number felt and experienced. In such simple records of day-to-day experiences is the human history of the Civil War fully revealed.

ARNOLD GATES

Garden City, New York.

The War Without Grant. By Robert R. McCormick. (New York: The Bond Wheelwright Company. 1950. Pp. 230. \$7.50.

THE APPEARANCE OF *The War Without Grant* in 1950, sixteen years after the publication of the author's *Ulysses S. Grant: The Great Soldier of America*, has caused his current publisher to reissue the earlier volume and to make both works available in boxed form. This is as it should be, of course, for the two volumes must be taken together to furnish the complete picture of the Civil War. They should be read in inverse order of issue, for *The War Without Grant* is in every way an advance agent for the book—or any book—on Grant.

The War Without Grant is not, however, as scholarly or as valuable a work as the late Colonel McCormick's biography of Grant. The author has here tried to cover all of the Civil War campaigns in which Grant was not a participant, and, by way of contrast, one campaign—The Wilderness—which Grant directed. He has attempted to do this in 230 pages of large print, with no bibliography, and with only nine of the fifteen chapters footnoted at all. The result is really a compilation of short essays, possibly dictated almost from memory by a man who knew the Civil War well. It is not a book to be read with much compre-

hension by one approaching this war for the first time, for the background of the conflict is sketched too lightly, and the continuity is broken too often. Nor is it a book for military students; not enough space is devoted to plans, orders, and tactical dispositions. Finally, the reader seeking factual biographical material should look elsewhere, for the brief sketches of nearly all commanders conform to the theme of the volume: Nothing very good was done anywhere unless Grant was there.

Accepted as a series of essays on Civil War campaigns and leaders, this book will be provocative—sometimes irritating—to the serious student. The author makes some rather flat statements of fact in a tone so authoritative that they almost, but not quite, pass unchallenged. The first sign of what may lie ahead appears in the brief introduction. Speaking of the evacuation of the Confederate garrison from Norfolk on 9 May 1862, McCormick says, "It was not until I was reading the proofs of *The War Without Grant* that I appreciated that this was the greatest, indeed the fatal blunder of the war. If the garrison had been retained in Norfolk by Johnston, Lee would have captured McClellan's entire army. With that accomplished Lee could have taken Washington and won the war." This is a thesis that the military historian will be unable to swallow without conditional seasoning; it seems to ignore entirely the naval situation, and to overestimate the capacity of the small Norfolk garrison to survive after the evacuation of the Yorktown line. It is also open to the obvious rebuttal: if the James were denied to McClellan as a base, leaving no alternate route of withdrawal, might he not have broken the stalemate by a desperation advance which—he certainly had the strength—might have taken Richmond?

The chapter on Fort Sumter devotes considerable space to the old suggestion that Major Anderson's motives in his negotiations with Beauregard and Wigfall were something less than 100 per cent patriotic. The single source reference fails to nail down this accusation, but it is thereafter treated as a fact. In the following chapter Colonel McCormick makes several references to Baker and Stone at Ball's Bluff, but never explains what happened there. Again, the serious student will not be bothered, but a newcomer to this period will be impelled to turn to a more standard work to fill in the many gaps.

Interestingly enough, Ben Butler gets very favorable treatment. Butler's movement of the Massachusetts troops by ferry to Annapolis in April 1861 is classified (p. 39) as "one of the most brilliant chapters of warfare," and Colonel McCormick later (p. 205) goes so far as to say of Butler that "if, instead of being moved out of the war to Fortress Monroe, he had been sent to Harpers Ferry, he certainly would not have made the blunder of Patterson . . . in not attacking Johnston at Winchester in the first Bull Run campaign. Bull Run, in all probability, would have been a Union victory, and the rebellion might have collapsed then and there. . . ." Actually there was nothing in Butler's military background to justify this prediction, and subsequent operations by the Massachusetts politician fail to reinforce it. The author, a volunteer soldier himself, perhaps naturally underscores the good work done by volunteer generals—at the expense, it must be said, of those from the regular ranks.

Colonel McCormick disposes of Jackson's Valley campaign in less than three pages, summing up by saying, "This is the celebrated Valley campaign which

caused enormous excitement at the time. It was actually a series of skirmishes and does not appear to have any effect upon the military situation" (p. 84). It is surprising that a man of some military experience finds nothing worth while in the swift marches of Jackson's "foot cavalry," and that eccentric commander's intelligent use of interior lines, his iron security, and his cool courage in the face of converging Union columns. While there is a danger of magnifying the Valley campaign out of all proportion to other contemporary events, never before has it been disposed of thus summarily.

The chapter on Gettysburg is the longest and perhaps the best of the book, and contains a terrain appreciation well worth reading. But as Grant was not at Gettysburg, the author seems obliged to have little good to say of any of the senior officers on either side, although, perversely, he tries to scrape some of the mud off Longstreet. Lee's attack of 2 July, usually best classified as "piece-meal and uncoordinated," Colonel McCormick labels as "Napoleon's famous maneuver at Friedland, with which, of course, Lee was entirely familiar" (p. 156). The inference is that the oblique order of battle was still valid in an age of increased ranges of small arms and artillery, a very debatable point, and the historical parallel would be enhanced by reference to Frederick at Leuthen, or even to Epaminondas at Leuctra, rather than to Napoleon at Friedland. Nevertheless, Gettysburg is one of the Colonel's favorite battles, and he gives it thorough treatment.

Most of the points of issue in this work are, naturally, matters of opinion. If the author feels that Butler and Banks were better generals than Reynolds and Hancock—well, after all, it's his book. There are a few errors of fact, such as saying (p. 63) that Joe Johnston was to continue to win victories after First Bull Run, or calling McClellan an artilleryman (p. 116), but none of them is very important.

The outstanding feature of this book, and perhaps a reason for the stiff price, is the cartography; there are twenty-one fine fold-in maps by Axel Kellstrom. Movements of troops and detailed tactical positions are shown in color, and the presentation of the topography is excellent. The text itself does not exploit the fine maps.

It cannot be said that *The War Without Grant* adds anything new to Civil War history, nor is it a particularly clear and concise presentation of the conflict. The old Civil War hand, already knowing the facts, will be interested in Colonel McCormick's opinions even though he may agree with few of them. For the military historian, this work will not displace Steele or Wood and Edmonds.

ARTHUR P. WADE

West Point, New York.

Stonewall Jackson and the Old Stonewall Brigade. By John Esten Cooke. Edited by Richard Barksdale Harwell. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 1954. Pp. 76. \$3.50.)

JOHN ESTEN COOKE (1830-1886) produced over thirty volumes, seven of which were based upon his Civil War experiences. He lived to see his books attain

considerable popularity and a measure of critical acclaim, but today his works are almost forgotten. His biographies of Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee are useful for their first-hand accounts of military operations. His best novels are *The Virginia Comedians* (1854), a treatment of Williamsburg before the Revolution, and *Surry of Eagle's Nest* (1866), a romance of the Civil War.

Three months before Jackson's death, Captain Esten Cooke contributed the first of a series of poems and sketches to a Richmond weekly, *The Southern Illustrated News*. Three articles appeared under the title "Stonewall Jackson, and the Old Stonewall Brigade." They are addressed to patriotic Confederates and contain "all the dash and passion and hero worship that marked Cooke's wartime reporting," Mr. Harwell asserts.

Cooke's sketches of Jackson and his men contain more eulogy than historical reporting. From the opening sentence, "Greatest of Generals is General Stonewall Jackson," to his rhetorical conclusion, Cooke embellishes his subject with language intended to inspire, language suggesting the birth of a legend.

The sketches are admittedly by one who has "often pressed [Jackson's] honest hand," one who treasures every precious anecdote because each is "a thing to tell to children's children." Here are most of the symbols, cultural and legendary, which came to be a part of the Southern cause: the personal approach, the religious overtones, the classical allusions, a love of poetry and a willingness to quote it, an assumption that rhetoric is superior to facts and that emotion is higher than reason, and many more. There are glimpses of battles and brief notes on other generals, but extravagant eulogy predominates.

The editor has appended short bibliographical descriptions in two sections entitled "Cooke's Lives of Jackson," and "The Chief Early Biographies of Jackson." Mr. Harwell's notations, sometimes less specific than an historian would desire, include such matters as Cooke's military career, his incorporation of the wartime sketches in his post-war novels, an account of the struggles to produce the first life of Jackson, available information on the missing manuscript of Cooke's first revision of his *Jackson*, and sparse bibliographical facts on the first seven lives of Jackson.

WILLIAM P. FIDLER

University, Alabama.

The Cotton Road. By Frank Feuille. (New York: William Morrow and Company. 1954. Pp. 320. \$3.50.)

THIS IS DESCRIBED AS A NOVEL about the overland trail from Houston, Texas, to Bagdad, Mexico, by means of which the Confederacy hoped to get its cotton to a neutral port to avoid the Federal blockade. "There was little in the records," the author says in a prefatory note. "In histories, in periodicals, in biographies, even in archives, references are sketchy. . . . The legend and folklore which my grandfather had given me remained the paramount source of material."

Grandfather must have been the tritest folklorist of them all. This novel contains a red-haired, mischievous fifteen-year-old named Timmy O'Shea; it has an old plantation, described as a symbol of gracious living, which is burned by

the Yankees; it has an English officer who is cashiered from his regiment because he is too honorable to reveal the shortcomings of a brother officer; it has a heroine named Eugenie who is a perfect lady, but who sometimes gets involuntarily disarranged ("the whole of a snowy, pink-tipped, perfectly rounded breast, rising and falling with each breath, lay before his eyes. He fought to control his breathing and wrenched his gaze away"); it has a French sea captain who speaks perfect English except for *Mon Dieu* and *mon enfant* (he does not, however, say *tiens!*); most of all, it has fights. Its protagonists fight Comanches, thirst, the Federals, Mexican bandits, rapists, northerners, wild boars, rattlers, and sin. And they do it in prose such as this:

"Lance, his face grim, stayed on his knees a few seconds more. He was no stranger to death, but the quickness, the unexpected manner of this first fatality stunned him for a moment. Then the double nature of the calamity smote him and galvanized him into furious action."

For those who are interested in side arms, there is also a lady who wears a brace of what are twice described as "Dragon pistols."

The jacket of the paper-back edition should be a rouser.

WILLIAM E. PORTER

Iowa City, Iowa.

Books Received

Anderson, John Q., editor. *Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1955. Pp. xxii, 400. \$4.95.) Reviewed in this issue.

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